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EDITORIAL NOTE: The editors wish to acknowledge from the
outset that the collection of documents appended below is very 
far from providing a comprehensive coverage of the roles of 
the various important groups and individuals affected by, or 
involved in the events of October 1, 1965. But we are confident 
that this collection constitutes a reasonably representative 
sample of the positions taken publicly by the political elements 
most directly concerned.
Priority has been given to material which has for one 
reason or another not yet been made readily accessible to 
students of Indonesian affairs. The chief criterion of selec­
tion has been, however, direct relevance to the actual events 
of October 1 and 2, in Djakarta and the regions most deeply 
affected. Each document is prefaced by a brief editorial com­
ment noting the time and place of issuance - where this is 
known. An attempt is also made - where necessary - to suggest 
the significance of some selections.
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I. STATEMENTS OF THE SEPTEMBER 30th MOVEMENT.
£ All translations are based on Indonesian texts found in Antara (Warta 
Berita), October 1 (afternoon edition) and Harian Rakiat, October 2*]
1. Initial Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Untung
(Text as broadcast over the Djakarta radio at approximately 7:15 a#m# on 
the morning of October 1#)
On Thursday, September 30, 1965, a military move took place within 
the Army in the capital city of Djakarta which was aided by troops from 
other branches of the Armed Forces# The September 30th Movement which 
is led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, Commandant of a Battalion of the 
Tjakrabirawa, the personal bodyguard of President Sukarno, is directed 
against Generals who were members of the self-styled Council of Generals#
A number of Generals have been arrested and important communications 
media and other vital installations have been placed under the control of 
the September 30th Movement, while President Sukarno is safe under its 
protection# Also a number of other prominent leaders in society, who had 
become targets of the action by the Council of Generals,are under the 
protection of the September 30th Movement#
The Council of Generals is a subversive movement sponsored by the CIA 
and has been very active lately, especially since President Sukarno was 
seriously ill in the first week of August of this year# Their hope that 
President Sukarno would die of his illness has not materialized#
Therefore, in order to attain its goal the Council of Generals had 
planned to conduct a show of force (m^chtvertoon) on Armed Forces Day, 
October 5 this year, by bringing troops from East, Central and West Java# 
With this large concentration of military power the Council of Generals 
had even planned to carry out a counter-revolutionary coup prior to 
October 5, 1965# It was to prevent such a counter-revolutionary coup that 
Lieutenant Colonel Untung launched the September 30th Movement which has 
proved a great success#
According to a statement obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the 
Commandant of the September 30th Movement, this movement is solely a move­
ment within the Army directed against the Council of Generals which has 
stained the name of the Army and harbored evil designs against the Republic 
of Indonesia and President Sukarno# Lieutenant Colonel Untung personally 
considers this movement as an obligation for him as a member of the 
Tjakrabirawa which has the duty to protect the President and the Republic 
of Indonesia#
The Commandant of the September 30th Movement further explained that 
the action already taken against the Council of Generals in Djakarta will 
be followed by actions throughout Indonesia against agents and sympathizers 
of the Council of Generals in the regions# According to the statement of 
the Commandant of the September 30th Movement, as a follow-up action, an
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Indonesian Revolution Council will be established in the capital, while 
in the regions Provincial, District, Sub-District, and Village Revolution 
Councils will be established. Members of the Revolution Council will be 
composed of civilians and military personnel who fully support the 
September 30th Movement®
Political parties, mass organizations, newspapers, and periodicals 
may continue functioning, provided that within a time period which will 
be specified later they declare their loyalty to the Indonesian Revolution 
Council.
The Indonesian Revolution Council which will be established by the 
September 30th Movement will consistently carry out the P^ntia Azirngt 
RevolusiA the decisions of the MPRS, the decisions of the DPR-GR, and 
the decisions of the DPA. The Indonesian Revolution Council will not 
change the Indonesian foreign policy, which is free and active and anti- 
nekolim, for the sake of peace in Southeast Asia and in the world. Also 
there will be no change of policy with regard to the Second Afro-Asian 
Conference and Conefo, as well as the confrontation against Malaysia; and 
KIAPMA, along with other international activities which have been scheduled 
to take place in Indonesia,will be held as planned.
As Commandant of the September 30th Movement, Lt. Colonel Untung 
called on the entire Indonesian people to continue to increase vigilance 
and fully assist the September 30th Movement in order to safeguard the 
Indonesian Republic from the wicked deeds of the Council of Generals and 
its agents> so that the Message of the Peopled Suffering can be fulfilled 
in the true sense of the word.
Lt. Colonel Untung appealed to all Army officers, non-commissioned 
officers and soldiers to be resolute and to act to eradicate completely 
the influence of the Council of Generals and its agents in the Army. 
Power-mad. Generals and officers who have neglected the lot of their men 
and who above the accumulated sufferings of their men have lived in luxury, 
led a gay life, insulted our women and wasted government funds, must be 
kicked out of the Army and punished accordingly. The Army is not for 
generals, but is the possession of all the soldiers of the Army who are 
loyal to the ideals of the revolution of August 1945. Lt. Colonel Untung 
thanked all troops of the Armed Forces outside the Army for their assis­
tance in the purging of the Army and hoped that purges also will be car­
ried out in the other branches of the Armed Forces against agents and 
sympathizers of the Council of Generals. Within a short time Commandant 
Lt. Colonel Untung will announce the First Decree concerning the Indonesian 
Revolution Council; other decrees will follow.
Djakarta, September 30, 1965.
Information Section of the September 30th Movement as broadcast 
over the Indonesian Radio in Djakarta.
The'tantja Azimat Revolusi" translates imperfectly as Mthe five charms 
of the Revolution11. As designated by President Sukarno in June 1965, 
these are the following Indonesian ideological concepts: Nasakom:
Pantjasila; the Political Manifesto; Trisakti: and Berdikari. See
Sukarno's Independence Day Speech on August 17, 1965%in Antara, August 
17, 1965.
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2* f>Decree No* 1 on the Establishment of the Indonesian Revolution Council11
(Text as read over the Djakarta radio at approximately 2:00 p*m*,
October 1*)
(Text) In the interest of the State of the Indonesian Republic, in 
the interest of safeguarding the implementation of the Pantiasila and the 
Pantia Azimat Revolusi completely, in the interest of the safety of the 
Army and of the Armed Forces in general, at midnight Thursday, September 
30, 1965, a purge was carried out in the Capital City of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Djakarta, against members of the self-styled Council of Generals 
which had planned a coup on the eve of Armed Forces Day, October 5, 1965.
A number of Generals have been arrested* Means of communications and 
other vital installations in the capital have fallen completely under the 
control of the September 30th Movement*
The September 30th Movement is a movement entirely confined within 
the body of the Army to put an end to arbitrary actions of Generals who 
were members of the Council of Generals and other Officers who were hench­
men and sympathizers of members of the Council of Generals* This movement 
was assisted by Armed Units not belonging to the Army*
2* To facilitate the follow-up of the action of September 30, 1965, 
the leadership of the September 30th Movement will set up an Indonesian 
Revolution Council whose members will consist of civilian and military 
individuals who unreservedly support the September 30th Movement*
For the time being, pending general elections for the Peoplefs Con­
sultative Council (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat) in line with the 
Constitution of 1945, the Indonesian Revolution Council will constitute 
the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia* The Indonesian 
Revolution Council is a tool of the entire Indonesian people to realize 
the Pantjasila and the Pantja Azimat Revolusi completely*
The Indonesian Revolution Council in its daily activities will be 
represented by a Presidium of the Council which will consist of the Com­
mandant and Deputy Commandants of the September 30th Movement*
3* With the falling of the entire authority of the State into the 
hands of the Indonesian Revolution Council, the Dwikora Cabinet automatic­
ally assumes a decommissioned status* Until the formation of a new 
Council of Ministers by the Indonesian Revolution Council,former ministers 
are dutybound to carry out routine tasks, and to preserve order in their 
respective departments* They are prohibited from appointing new employees 
and from taking actions which may have broad consequences* All former 
ministers are obliged to give a full account to the Indonesian Revolution 
Council, along with the new ministers to be appointed by the Indonesian 
Revolution Council*
4* As instruments of the Indonesian Revolution Council, there are to 
be established in the regions, Provincial Revolution Councils (with a maxi­
mum membership of 25), District Revolution Councils (with a maximum member­
ship of 15), Subdistrict Revolution Councils (with a maximum membership of
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10), and Village Revolution Councils (with a maximum membership of 7)#
They are to be composed of civilian and military personnel who unreservedly 
support the September 30th Movement*
These Regional Revolution Councils constitute the highest authority in 
the regions concerned* At the provincial and district levels they are 
assisted in their work by the respective Bodies for Day to Day Administra­
tion (BPH), while at the subdistrict and village levels they are assisted 
by the local National Front Leadership composed of individuals who unre­
servedly support the September 30th Movement*
5* The Presidium of the Indonesian Revolution Council consists of the 
Commandant and Deputy Commandants of the September 30th Movement. The 
Commandant and Deputy Commandants of the September 30th Movement are Chair­
man and Vice Chairmen of the Indonesian Revolution Council*
6* Immediately after the establishment of Regional Revolution Councils 
the Revolution Council Chairman concerned must report to the Revolution 
Council one level higher concerning the full composition of the Council 
membership* Provincial Revolution Councils must acquire written approval 
from the Presidium of the Indonesian Revolution Council* District Revolu­
tion Councils must acquire written approval from the Provincial Revolution 
Councils and the Subdistrict and Village Revolution Councils must acquire 
written approval from the District Revolution Councils*
Djakarta, October 1, 1965* Command of the September 30th Movement* 
Commandant: Lieutenant Colonel Untung* Deputy Commandant: Brigadier
General Supardjo; Deputy Commandant: Flight Lieutenant Colonel Heru;
Deputy Commandant: Sea Colonel Sunardi| Deputy Commandant: Adjunct Senior
Police Commissioner Anwas* Announced by the Information Section of the 
September 30th Movement on October 1, 1965.
3# "Decision No* 1 Concerning the Composition of the Indonesian Revolution 
Council71
(Text as read over the Djakarta Radio at approximately 2:05 p*m.,October 1*)
I* Fulfilling the provisions of Decree No. 1 concerning the Formation of 
The Indonesian Revolution Council, herewith follows the full membership 
of the Indonesian Revolution Council:
1* Lieutenant Colonel UNTUNG, Chairman of the Council.
2. Brigadier General SUPARDJO, Vice-Chairman of the Council.
3. Flight Lieutenant Colonel HERU, Vice-Chairman of the Council.
4* Sea Colonel SUNARDI, Vice-Chairman of the Council*
5* Adjunct Senior Police Commissioner ANWAS, Vice-Chairman of the Council.
6. OMAR DHANI, Air Vice Marshal*
7. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, Police Inspector General.
8. E. MARTADINATA, Vice Admiral.
9. DR. SUBANDRIO.
10. DR. J. LEIMENA.
11. IR. SURACHMAN (Nationalist Group).
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12. FATAH JASIN (Religious Group).
13. K. H. SIRADJUDDIN ABBAS (Religious Group).
14. TJUGITO (Communist Group).
15. ARUDJI KARIAWINATA.
16. SIAUW GIOK TJHAN.
17. SUMARNO S. H.
18. HARTONO, Major General, Navy Marine Corps.
19. SUTARTO, Police Brigadier General.
20. ZAINI MANSUR (Central Youth Front).
21. JAHJA S. H. (Central Youth Front).
22. SUKATNO (Central Youth Front).
23. BAMBANG KUSNOHADI (PPMI).
24. ABDUL RAHMAN (Deputy Secretary General of the National Front).
25. HARDOJO (University Student).
26. BASUKI RACHMAT, Major General.
27. RYACUDU, Brigadier General.
28. SOLICHIN, Brigadier General.
29. AMIR MAHMUD, Brigadier General.
30. ANDI RIVAI, Brigadier General.
31. SUJONO, Flight Major.
32. LEO WATTIMENA, Air Commodore.
33. MRS. UTAMI SURJADARMA.
34. A. LATIEF, Colonel.
35. UMAR WIRAHADIKUSUMAH, Major General.
36. MRS. SUPEN1.
37. MRS. MAHMUDAH MAWARDI.
38. MRS. SUHARTI SUWARTO.
39. FATAH, Colonel.
40. SUHERMAN, Colonel.
41. SAMSU SUTJIPTO, Sea Colonel.
42. SUHARDI (Journalist).
43. DRS. SUMARTONO, Senior Police Commissioner.
44. DJUNTA SUHARDI.
45. KARIM D. P. (Indonesian Journalists Association).
II. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen of the Council constitute the 
Presidium of the Indonesian Revolution Council which between two 
plenary sessions of the Council acts on behalf of the Council.
III. All civilian members of the Indonesian Revolution Council are given 
the right to use the military insignia of Lieutenant Colonel or 
equivalent rank. Indonesian Revolution Council members from the 
Armed Forces group maintain their previous ranks with the exception 
that those higher than Lieutenant Colonel must use the same ranks 
as that of the Commandant of the September 30th Movement, namely 
that of Lieutenant Colonel or the equivalent.
COMMAND OF THE SEPTEMBER 30th MOVEMENT 
Chairman of the Indonesian Revolution Council 
Signed
(Lieutenant Colonel Untung)
DJAKARTA, October 1, 1965.
Announced by the Information Section of the September 30th Movement 
on October 1, 1965.
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4* "Decision No* 2 concerning Demotion and Promotion in Rank11
(Text as read over the Djakarta radio at approximately 2:10 p.m* on 
October 1.)
1* As all authority in the State of the Republic of Indonesia on 
September 30, 1965, was taken over by the September 30th Movement and as 
its Commandant is an Officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, all 
ranks and equivalent grades in the Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia above that of Lieutenant Colonel are herewith declared invalid*
All officers who were previously of a rank higher than Lieutenant 
Colonel must state their loyalty in written form to the Indonesian 
Revolution Council and only thereafter have they the right to use the 
rank of Lieutenant Colonel* Lieutenant Colonel is the highest rank in 
the Armed Forces of the State of the Republic of Indonesia*
2* Because the September 30th Movement is basically a movement of 
lower-ranking Soldiers, especially of Enlisted Men and NCO's, it is 
herewith stated that all Enlisted Men and NCO's of all Armed Forces of 
the Republic of Indonesia who support the September 30th Movement are 
promoted one grade above those they occupied before September 30, 1965*
3* All Enlisted Men and NCO's who took a direct part in the purge 
against the members of the Council of Generals on the evening of September 
30, 1965,in Djakarta are promoted to two grades above those they occupied 
prior to September 30, 1965*
Commandant of the September 30th Movement/Chairman of the Indonesian 
Revolution Council*
Signed: Lieutenant Colonel Untung* Djakarta, October 1, 1965*
Announced by the Information Section of the September 30th Movement 
on October 1, 1965*
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5. AFFILIATIONS OF INDONESIAN REVOLUTION COUNCIL MEMBERS 
[Compiled by the Editors]
Name Official Position Party Ethnic Group
*1. Lieutenant Colonel 
UNTUNG
Commander, 1st Battalion, 
Tjakrabirawa Regiment
- Javanese
*2. Brig. Gen. SUPARDJO Commander, Fourth Combat 
Command (West Kalimantan)
- Javanese
*3* Flight Lieutenant ? Javanese
Colonel HERU ATMQDJO
*4. Sea Colonel SUNARD1 ? - Javanese
5. Adjunct Senior Police ? - 1
Commissioner ANWAS
6. Air Vice Marshal 
OMAR DHANI
Minister/Coramander of 
the Air Force
- Javanese
7. Brig. Gen. SUTJIPTO 
JUDODIHARDJO
Minister/Commander of 
the Police
- Javanese
8. Vice Admiral R. 
EDDY MARTADINATA
Minister/Coramander of 
the Navy
- Sundanese
9. Dr. SUBANDRIO First Deputy Prime Minis- 
ter/Foreign Minister
(nominally
P.N.I.)
Javanese
10. Dr. J. LEIMENA Second Deputy Prime 
Mini s t er/Coordinat ing 
Minister for Distribution
Parkindo Ambonese
11. Ir. SURACHMAN Minister for People's 
Irrigation
P.N.I.
(secretary.
general)
Javanese
12. K. H. FATAH JASIN Minister of State N.U. Javanese
13. K. H. SIRADJUDDIN 
ABBAS
- PERTI
(chairman)
Minangkabau
14. TJUGITO Member of Political 
Bureau of KOTRAR
Communist Javanese
15. ARUDJI KARTAWINATA Chairman of the DPRGR P.S.I.I.
(chairman)
Sundanese
16. SIAUW GIOK TJHAN - BAPERKI
(chairman)
Chinese
An asteridc indicates the person concerned took an 
1, 1965, coup, so far as is known.
active part in the October
I4l
Name Official Position Party Ethnic Group
17. SUMARNO, S. H. Coordinating Minister 
for Finance
P.N.I. Javanese
18. Maj. Gen. (Marine 
Corps) HARTONO
Commander of the Marine 
Corps
- Javanese
19. Police Brig. Gen. 
SUTARTO
Chief of Staff of Central 
Intelligence Agency
Javanese
20. ZAINI MANSUR Central Youth Front 
(Presidium member)
P.N.I.
(General 
Chairman Gera- 
kan Pemuda 
Marhaenis)
Palembang
21. JAHJA, S. H. Central Youth Front 
(Presidium member)
N.U.
(General
Secretary)
Javanese?
22. SUKATNO Central Youth Front 
(Presidium member)
Communist 
(Secretary- 
General Pe­
muda Rakjat)
Javanese
23. BAMBANG KUSNOHADI P.P*MoI<, (Chairman) P.N.I.
(Chairman of 
the G.M.N.I.)
Javanese
24. ABDUL RACHMAN National Front (Deputy 
Secretary General)
N.U. ?
25. HARDOJO D.P.R«G.R. (Youth 
Repre sentat ive)
Communist Javanese
26. Maj. Gen. BASUKI 
RACHMAT
Commander, East Java 
(VIII) Territorial 
Division
— Javanese
27. Brig. Gen. RYACUDU Commander, West Kali­
mantan (XII) Terri­
torial Division
•* Ambonese
28. Brig. Gen. SOLICHIN Commander, South and 
Southeast Sulawesi (XIV) 
Territorial Division
- Sundanese
29. Brig. Gen. AMIR 
MACHMUD
Commander, South 
Kalimantan (X) Terri­
torial Division
- Sundanese?
30. Brig. Gen. ANDI 
RIVAI
Governor of South and 
Southeast Sulawesi
- Buginese?
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Name Official Position Party
*31# Flight Major SUJONO Commander of the Guard
at Halim Airbase
32. Air Commodore LEO 
WATTIMENA
Commander of the AURI 
Operations Command/Halim 
Airbase; Chief of Staff, 
Mandala Siaga Command
33. Mrs. UTAMI 
SURJADARMA
Rector of Respublica 
University (BAPERKI)
*34. Colonel A. IATIEF Commander, 1st Infantry 
Brigade, Djakarta Raya (V) 
Territorial Division
35. Maj. Gen. UMAR 
WIRAHADIKUSUMAH
Commander, Djakarta Raya 
(V) Territorial Division
36. Mrs. SUPENI Third Deputy Foreign 
Minister
P.N.I.
37. Mrs. MAHMUDAH 
MAWARDI
38. Mrs. SUHARTI 
SUWARTO
N.U.
(Ketua
Muslimat)
Communist
(2nd
Chairwoman
GERWANI)
39# Colonel FATAH 
*40. Colonel SUHERMAN
4 1 # Sea Colonel
SJAMSU SUTJIPTO
42. SUHARDI
43. Senior Police Com­
missioner Drs. 
SUMARTONO
44. DJUNTA SUWARDI 
45# A, KARIM D. P.
First Assistant to the 
Chief of Staff, Central 
Java (VII) Territorial 
Division
Chief of the Navy 
Information Centre
Head of Legal Depart­
ment, P.W.I. (Central)
Chief of Police, East 
Kalimantan (XIV)
Police District
Chairman P.W.I. P.N.I.
Ethnic Group 
Javanese
Ambonese
Javanese
Sundanese?
Sundanese
Javanese
Javanese
Javanese
?
Javanese
Javanese
Javanese?
Javanese
Javanese? 
Bugine se
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II. STATEMENTS BY THE INDONESIAN AIR FORCE
1. Air Force Commander Dani's Order of the Day. Issued at 
9:30 a.m., October 1 and Broadcast at about 3:30 p.m.. October 1. 
L~fhe following translation is based on the virtually identical 
Indonesian texts appearing in Antara (Warta Berita), October 1 
(Afternoon Edition); Harian Rakjat, October 2; and Berita Yudha, 
October 4. An English translation of the Djakarta radio broad- 
cast of October 3 has also been consulted. The only significant 
divergences among these four texts are that the Antara and 
Berita Yudha versions fail to say where the statement was issued; 
and the Antara and Harian Rakjat reports omit the Press Release 
Number provided by the other two sources.
In addition to the sources cited above,Dani's Order of the 
Day also appeared in at least two of the afternoon Djakarta 
papers for*October 1, namely the leftist papers Warta Bhakti 
and Gelora Indonesia. The more conservative Protestant after­
noon paper Sinar Ha'rapan, which would have less reason to be 
pleased by the professed intentions of the September 30th 
Movement, did not publish the Dani order. It is important to 
note also that this Dani order was broadcast by the Untung- 
controlled Djakarta radio at about 3:30 p.m. on October 1.
Finally, it is of interest that this Dani Order of the 
Day also figures prominently in the immediate aftermath of 
the events of October 1. On October 3 the Army-controlled 
Djakarta radio repeatedly broadcast this October 1 Dani 
order, but always following it with Dani's statement of October 
2 at Halim Air Base (See below for the text). The second 
statement was presented "as a correction of the Order of the 
Day." The same treatment is given to the Dani statements in 
Berita Yudha for October 4.]
Press Release No. U45/Pen/1965 on the Order of the Day 
of the Minister/Commander of the Indonesian Air Force.
(Text) Today, Friday, October 1, 1965, at 09:30 hours, 
the Minister/Commander of the Indonesian Air Force, Air Vice 
Marshal Omar Dani,issued the following Order of the Day:
1. On the night of September 30, 1965, the September 30th 
Movement launched a movement to secure and safeguard the Rev­
olution and the Great Leader of the Revolution against C.I.A. 
subversion. In this connection, the body of the Army has 
already been purged Cdiadakan pembersihanl of those elements 
who are manipulated by foreign subversives and who endanger 
the Indonesian Revolution.
2. With the establishment of the aforementioned movement, 
foreign subversives and their henchmen will not remain idle and
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will very likely intensify their anti-revolutionary movement.
3. The Indonesian Air Force as an instrument of the 
Revolution will always and continuously support and uphold 
any progressive revolutionary movement. Conversely, the 
Indonesian Air Force will combat any action which endangers 
the Indonesian Revolution.
4. Herewith we order all members of the Indonesian Air 
Force to maintain vigilance against provocations and harass- 
ments and to intensify preparedness against all eventualities, 
internal as well as external.
Signed
(OMAR DANI)
Air Vice Marshal
Issued at: Department of the Indonesian
Air Force.
Date: October 1, 1965. Time: 09:30
2. Air Force Commander Dani's Statement in Jogjakarta. Issued 
on October 2, presumably before mid-afternoon.
[The translation is based on the Indonesian text appearing in 
the October 4 report of the Jogjakarta daily Kedaulatan Rakjat. 
It is noteworthy that this issue would have appeared before 
loyalist troops under Diponegoro Commander Brigadier General 
Surjosumpeno retook Jogjakarta. As far as the editors know, 
this Dani statement has never appeared in the Djakarta press.
While the news report containing the text of the Dani 
statement gives October 2 as the date of issuance, it is not 
clear precisely when it was put out. It has been widely re­
ported that Dani flew from Halim Air Base,outside of Djakarta, 
to Jogjakarta,sometime between midnight and 3:00 a.m. on the 
morning of October 2. (See, for example, Api Pantjasila, 
October 14). It is also known that Dani appeared at the Koti 
meeting in Bogor late on the afternoon of October 2. (See the 
Suharto October 15 speech cited below). Accordingly the pre­
sumption is that Dani issued the statement sometime during 
his approximately twelve hour stay in Central Java. The fact 
that the statement apparently appeared onlv in the Jogjakarta 
newspaper is the best ground for assuming that the statement 
was issued in the vicinity of that city —  very likely at the 
Adisutjipto Air Force Base. In this latter regard, however, 
it is noteworthy —  but perhaps understandable —  that the 
Commander of that air base makes no reference to Dani in his 
press statement published in Berita Yudha, November 30.
The headline and introductory paragraph of the news report 
on the Dani statement are also given below.]
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BUNG KARNO CAME ON HIS OWN TO HALIM AIR BASE 
Fighting Avoided After Misunderstanding Corrected
Minister/Commander of the Air Force Omar Dani on October 
2 issued a statement about the condition of President Sukarno 
and explained that there had been no effort to kidnap our be­
loved Bung Karno. The complete text of the statement is as 
follows:
[TEXT] 1. To clear up conflicting reports about the In­
donesian Air Force in the last few days it is thought necessary 
to issue a statement to clarify the true situation.
2. On the morning of Friday, October 1, 1965, the President/ 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the 
Revolution agreed [berkenan] to come to the Halim Perdanakusuma 
Air Base voluntarily latas kehendak Beliau sendiri] because
this was the only place he regarded as truly safe in the 
Djakarta area at that time.
3. The President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/
Great Leader of the Revolution is safe and well.
4. On that day talks were also held between the President/ 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the 
Revolution, the Second Deputy Prime Minister [Leimena], the 
Commander of the Navy [Eddy Martadinata], the Commander of
the Police [Sutjipto Judodihardjo] and various other leaders 
concerning the situation in the capital which was still not 
at all clear.
5. As a result of these talks, inter alia the President 
issued an Order of the Day the text of which was also at that 
time sent to the RRI studio in Djakarta for broadcasting.
6. The essential contents of this Order of the Day were:
a. The President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/ 
Great Leader of the Revolution is safe and well.
b. The President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/ 
Great Leader of the Revolution continues to hold 
[tetap memegang] the top leadership of the state 
and revolution.
c. The leadership and the problems of the Army have 
been taken over by the President/Supreme Commander 
of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution 
and the daily tasks have been turned over for the 
time being to Maj. Gen. Pranoto.
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d. All units of the Armed Forces are to stand fast,
meaning that units must remain in their own quarters 
and may not act until they receive orders from the 
President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/
Great Leader of the Revolution.
7. On the night of October 1, 1965, units of the Army 
which were opposed to one another were confronting each other 
around the Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base and it was 
thought that fighting would break out. For the safety of the 
President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great Leader
of the Revolution and of his own free will, he agreed [berkenan] 
to leave Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base.
8. In harmony with the contents of the Order of the Day 
of the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great 
Leader of the Revolution and to avoid the possibility of unde­
sired bloodshed, units of the Air Force with the task of 
guarding Halim Perdanakusuma Base made no resistance whatever 
when units of the Army entered and occupied the Base on the 
morning of October 2, 1965.
9. Accordingly, it is stated that the whole membership 
of the Indonesian Air Force always and continuously stands 
behind the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/
Great Leader of the Revolution and obeys all his orders.
This is an official announcement of the Indonesian Air Force, 
signed by the Minister/Commander of the Air Force, Air Vice 
Marshal Omar Dani.
3. Deputy Air Force Commander’s Statement. Issued at 2:00 p.m., 
October 2. *
[The following translation is based on the Indonesian text 
appearing in Berita Yudha of October U and an English trans­
lation of the i)-jakarta radio broadcast of the statement on 
the evening of October 2. Although broadcast by Army authori­
ties several hours before the statement of Omar Dani issued at 
Halim Air Base on October 2, it is not yet clear whether in 
fact that Dani statement appeared after or before the statement 
here.]
[TEXT] Announcement of the Information Center of the Department 
pf the Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia No. 446/Pen/1965, 
on the continued obedience and loyalty of the Indonesian Air 
Force to the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/
Great Leader of the Revolution:
1. In view of the fact that the names of a number of officers
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of the Indonesian Air Force have been included in the so-called 
Indonesian Revolution Council which was set up bv the counter­
revolutionary group which calls itself the September 30th 
Movement, it is hereby announced that the officers concerned,as 
well as the Department of the Air Force of the Republic of 
Indonesia, have absolutely no knowledge of the composition or 
purpose of the so-called Revolution Council*
2. All personnel of the Indonesian Air Force are urged to 
continue to be vigilant and obedient while awaiting further 
orders from the President, Bung Karno. The Air Force of the 
Republic of Indonesia continues to safeguard unity and harmony 
of the progressive revolutionary forces and tools of the Rev­
olution, in order jointly to destroy the counter-revolutionaries 
and Nekolim, who are endangering the Revolution and the State
of the Republic of Indonesia,
3, All members of the Air Force of the Republic of In­
donesia are urged to enhance their vigilance and continue to 
carry out their respective tasks as usual*
Issued at the Department of the Air Force of the Republic of 
Indonesia on October 2, 1965, at 14:00 hours.
In the name of the Minister/Commander of the Indonesian Air 
Force, Deputy Minister/Commander of the Air Force.
Signed
Air Commodore Andoko
4. Air Force Commander Dani's Statement at Halim Air Base*
Issued sometime after 4 : 00 p * m *", October % *
[The following translation is "based on the Indonesian text 
appearing in Berita Yudha of October 4. An English translation 
of the Dj akarta radio broadcast of October 3 has also been 
consulted and provided the additional information that the 
statement was apparently issued at Halim Air Base, presumably 
after Dani's return from Central Java at about 4:00 p.m. on 
October 2. See introductory note above for the October 1 
Dani Order of the Day.]
The statement of the Indonesian Air Force, No. 005/207/65, 
is as follows:
1. The Indonesian Air Force is not involved in the Sep­
tember 30th Movement.
2. The Indonesian Air Force agrees with any purging 
movement [gerakan pembersihan] which is established within the 
body of any instrument of the Revolution in conformity with
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the line of the Great Leader of the Revolution.
3. The Indonesian Air Force does not interfere in the 
internal affairs of other services.
H. The Indonesian Air Force has no knowledge of the 
Indonesian Revolution Council or of the composition of its 
personnel.
Minister/Commander of the Air Force 
Signed: Omar Dani, Air Vice Marshal
Halim Perdanakusuma Air Base 
October 2, 1965.
5. Statement of the 7th Regional Air Command of Central Java. 
Issued near Jogjakarta on October 2.
[Translation is based on the Indonesian text found in the 
Semarang daily Gema Massa of October 8, 1965. As far as is 
known, this statement did not appear in the Djakarta press. 
Adisutjipto Air Force Base is near Jogjakarta.]
Statement of the 7th Regional Air Command of Central Java/ 
Jogjakarta Special Region, No: Korud VII/010/65:
1. The 7th Regional Air Command agrees with any purging 
movement [gerakan pembersihan] which is established within 
the body of any Instrument of the revolution.
2. The 7th Regional Air Command does not interfere in 
the internal affairs of other services.
3. The 7th Regional Air Command continues to preserve 
unity and harmony while remaining vigilant for provocation 
and harassment.
*+. The 7th Regional Air Command stands behind the Great 
Leader of the Revolution without reserve and will follow all 
of His ExcellencyTs orders.
Issued at Adisutjipto Air Force Base
on October 2, 1965.
Commander of the 7th Regional Air Command 
Signed
(S. D. INDARTO)
Air Commodore
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6. Statement by the Commander of the Panasan Air Force Base. 
Issued near Surakarta on October 3. ""
LThe translation is based on the Indonesian text found in 
Kedaulatan Rakjat (Jogjakarta daily), October 12. The text of 
the entire news report is given. Panasan Air Force Base is 
near Surakarta.]
The Commander of Panasan Air Force Base, Flight Lieutenant 
Colonel Soejoto, on October 3, 1965, issued a statement at 
Panasan Air Force Base, No. Pns/OL/65, as follows:
A. The Message of His Excellency President/Supreme Com­
mander of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution 
Bung Karno, dated October 1, 1965.
B. The statements of the Honorable Minister/Commander of 
the Air Force Air Vice Marshal Omar Dani, the first dated 
October 1, 1965, and [the second ?] no. Dep. 05/207/65, dated 
October 2, 1965,
C. Statement of the 7th Regional Air Command of Central 
Java, no. Korud VII/010/65.
1. Panasan Air Force Base agrees with any purging movement 
[gerakan pembersihan] which is established within the body of 
any instrument of the revolution.
2. Panasan Air Force Base does not interfere in the internal 
affairs of other services.
3. Panasan Air Force Base continues to preserve unity and har­
mony .
i*. Panasan Air Force Base stands behind the Great Leader of 
the Revolution without reserve and will follow all of His 
Excellency's orders.
Statement issued over RRI Surakarta on Monday, October 4, 
1965, at 06:30 a.m.
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III. STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT SUKARNO AND 
THE TJAKRABIRAWA REGIMENT
1. Announcement by the Tjakrabirawa Commander. Issued at 
12:00 p.m., October 1 and Broadcast at 1:10 p.m., October 1. 
[During the period In which the Untung group*controlled the 
Djakarta radio there were no broadcasts by President Sukarno 
himself or of statements or orders attributed to him. The 
President's Order of the Day (See item 2. below) was for un­
explained reasons not broadcast —  although it was issued 
well before the Untung group surrendered control of the radio. 
Accordingly, the announcement by Brigadier General Sabur, 
Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment [the President's "palace 
guard"], broadcast by the Untung-controlled radio at 1:10 p.m. 
October 1, constitutes the only authoritative news of the Pre­
sident released by the Untung radio. Considering that in the 
wake of the events of October 1 General Sabur has not dis­
owned this statement and has still retained his position, it 
seems clear that his announcement of October 1 was indeed 
authoritative —  i.e. authorized by the President himself.
The translation given below is of the lead story in the 
October 1st afternoon edition of the Djakarta newspaper Sinar 
Harapan. It gives not only the text of the actual Sabur 
announcement —  identical to the announcement as broadcast 
over the Untung radio at 1:10 p.m.-- but some significant de­
tails about the time and place of issue as well as the fact 
that Sabur himself was not present when the statement was 
issued. Moreover, Sinar Harapan*s treatment of the Sabur 
announcement as its feature storv is in itself of significance. 
Unlike the leftist afternoon papers, such as Warta Bhakti,
Gelora Indonesia, Kebudajaan Baru and Ekonomi Nasional, this 
Protestant Party newspaper refrained from publishing any of 
the broadcasts of the Untung-controlled radio. The only news 
report it published relating to the September 30th Movement —  
though never explicitly mentioning it bv name —  was this 
Sabur statement which apparently it secured in press release 
form because,it printed information not provided in the 1:10 p.m. 
radio broadcast. It should be pointed out, however, that 
since Sinar Harapan normally goes to press at least an hour 
after the other afternoon Djakarta papers, its editors had 
more time to learn that by mid-afternoon the tide had begun 
to turn against the Untung forces.]
PRESIDENT CONTINUES TO EXECUTE STATE LEADERSHIP
President Sukarno is safe and well and continues to ex­
ecute [tetap djalankan] the leadership of the State. Such was 
the announcement by the Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, 
Brigadier General Mochammad [£ apparently an error] Sabur, 
early Friday afternoon, at 12:00 in the Headquarters of the
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Tjakrabirawa Regiment.
The complete text of the official statement as read by 
the Chief of Staff of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, Lieutenant 
Colonel Merokeh Santoso,is as follows:
"In order to prevent inappropriate reports and interpre­
tations, I herewith announce that His Excellency the President/ 
Great Leader of the Revolution is safe and well, and continues 
to execute the leadership of the State."
2. President Sukarno’s Order of the Day Appointing Major 
General Pranoto as Caretaker of the Army. Reportedly Issued 
at 1:30 p.m., October 1.
LThe translation is based on the Indonesian text appearing in 
Antara, October 2 (Morning Edition). Although the time and 
place of the issuance of this statement are not given in the 
Antara report, the presumption is that it was issued from Halim 
Air Base early on the afternoon of October 1. The Indonesian 
Daily News (Surabaja) of October 4 gives 1:30 p.m. as the'time 
of issuance.]
The President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great 
Leader of the Revolution makes the following announcement:
1. As President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great 
Leader of the Revolution, I hereby announce:
That I am safe and well and continue to hold the leadership 
of the state and the revolution.
That the leadership of the Armed Forces of the Republic 
of Indonesia is temporarily directly in the hands of the 
President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
That Major General Pranoto Reksosamudro, Third Assistant 
to the Minister/Commander of the Army, has been temporarily 
appointed to carry out dav-to-day tasks within the Army.
2. I command the entire Armed Forces of the Reoublic of Indo­
nesia to heighten their preparedness, to return to and stay at 
their respective posts, and only move on orders.
3. The entire public is ordered to remain calm, enhance their 
vigilance, and preserve harmony and national unity as closely 
as possible.
Issued in Djakarta, on October 1, 1965.
The President/Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces, Great Leader of the Revolution, 
signed
Soekarno
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3. Announcement by the Tjakrabirawa Commander Following the 
Collapse of the September 3Qth Movement. Broadcast at H i 15 
a.m., October 2.
[This broadcast was made at 12:15 a.m., October 2, after RRI 
Djakarta was again in Army hands. The translation is based 
on the text given in Berita Yudha, October 2, 1965. The 
reader*s attention is drawn to the curious textual discrepancy 
between this announcement and that made by Sabur while the 
Untung group still controlled Djakarta Radio. (See above item 
1 in this section.)]
Bung Karno
Reassumes Leadership 
of the State
The Commandant of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, Brig. Gen. M. 
Sabur, in his announcement broadcast over RRI at 12:15 a.m. 
Saturday morning, declared that the President/Supreme Comman­
der of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung 
Karno was at present safe and well and had reassumed [kembali 
memegang] the leadership of the State.
*4. President Sukarno*s First Message Following the Collapse 
of the September 30th Movement. Broadcast at 1:33 a.m., 
October 3 *
LThe translation is based on the Indonesian text in Berita 
Yudha of October *4.]
Brothers, repeating my order as Supreme Commander of 
the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution which was 
announced on October 1, 1965, and to eliminate all uncertainty 
among the people, herewith I once again declare that I am 
safe and well and continue to hold the top leadership of the 
state and the top [leadership] of the government and the Indo­
nesian Revolution.
Today, October 2, 1965, I summoned all Commanders of the 
Armed Forces, together with Second Deputy Prime Minister* Dr. 
Leimena, and other important officials, with the purpose of 
quickly settling the problem of the so-called September 30th 
Affair. To be able to settle this problem I have ordered the 
prompt creation of a calm and orderly atmosphere and for this 
purpose it is necessary to prevent any possibility of armed 
conflict.
In the oresent stage of the determined struggle of the 
Indonesian people, I command the entire population contin­
uously to increase vigilance and preDaredness in the framework
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of intensifying the implementation of Dwikora.
I appeal to all the Indonesian people to continue to re­
main calm and to all ministers and other officials contin­
uously to carry out their respective duties as before.
At present the leadership of the Army is directly in 
my hands, and to discharge the day-to-day tasks within the 
Army, I have appointed temporarily Major General Pranoto 
Reksosamudro, Third Assistant to the Minister/Commander of 
the Army.
To carry out the restoration of security and order in 
connection with the September 30th Affair, I have appointed 
Major General Suharto, Commander of KOSTRAD, in accordance 
with the policy I have already outlined.
Brothers, let us persist in nurturing the spirit of 
national unity and harmony. Let us steadfastly kindle the 
anti-Nekolim spirit. God be with us all.
5 • President S u k a r n o ^  Second Message. Broadcast at 11:52 p.m., 
October 3 .
tthe translation is based on the Indonesian text found in 
Berita Yudha of October 5. Also see the English translation 
of the Djakarta Radio broadcast for October 3.]
Brothers, in view of a number of misunderstandings which 
can create conflicts among the Armed Forces, to eliminate 
any uncertainty in the community, and to build stronger national 
unity and harmony in the framework of the Dwikora struggle, 
herewith I, as President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/ 
Great Leader of the Revolution, announce that:
1. The charge against the Indonesian Air Force of involve­
ment in the September 30th Affair is not true.
2. My going to the Halim Air Base early on the morning of 
October 1 was at my own desire, as I was of the opinion that 
the best place for me was a place near an airplane which could 
transport me at any moment to another place if something un­
expected took place.
3. We must remain vigilant and prevent the playing off 
against one another of the Air Force and the Army to the advan­
tage of Nekolim and other groups.
Therefore, I order all members of the Armed Forces to 
unite for the security of the State and Revolution. That 
is all. Respect my order.
[ditempat] . October 3, 1965 
signed
SOEKARNO
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6. President Sukarno's First Press Interview after the Collapse 
of the Sentember 30th Movement. Given and published on October 
14. “
[The translation is based on an Antara report carried in the 
Protestant newspaper Sinar Harapan, October 14, 1965].
(Antara). The President/Great Leader of the Revolution will 
formulate a political solution for the problem which has 
arisen as a result of the so-called "September 30th Movement" 
on the basis of real facts and not on the basis of inflammatory 
statements from whatever quarter.
The President/Great Leader of the Revolution made this 
statement yesterday morning to the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of the Antara National News Agency, Mohammad Nahar, 
in the Freedom Palace. This is the first press interview 
given by President Sukarno since the occurrence of the 
counter-revolutionary adventure of the "September 30th Move­
ment" .
When asked whether the President/Great Leader of the 
Revolution had already developed a formula for the political 
solution of the problem which has arisen because of the 
"September 30th Movement", the President/Great Leader of the 
Revolution answered: "Laat dat maar aan mij over, wait and
see!" (Serahkan itu padaku. Tunggulah!) [Leave that to me.
Just wait and see!]
The President immediately added that his political solu­
tion will be based upon "real facts" and not on the basis of 
inflammatory statements from whatever quarter.
According to information obtained by the Antara reporter, 
since the occurrence of the so-called "September-5Wh Movement" 
the President/Great Leader of the Revolution has been constantly 
busy, with very little time to rest, holding consultations and 
discussions with his ministerial assistants as well as the 
leaders of the Armed Forces and other important persons and 
leaders in order to discuss day-to-day governmental problems 
so that everything can run smoothly and normally.
PRESIDENT STILL TRUSTS THE TJAKRABIRAWA
In the interview held on the back veranda of the Freedom 
Palace, where the President/Great Leader of the Revolution 
was busily conducting discussions and giving instructions to 
his assistants in the government, the President/Great Leader 
of the Revolution was also asked whether his trust in the 
Tjakrabirawa Regiment had been shaken in connection with the 
temporary involvement of elements of the Tjakrabirawa in the 
"September 30th Movement".
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In this connection, the President made several comments 
and clarifications as to how the units of the Tjakrabirawa 
Regiment had carried out their duties at critical moments, 
in order to secure and safeguard the President/Great Leader 
of the Revolution* He explained that when, at his own desire 
and not because of pressure or threats from anyone, he left, 
Freedom Palace on the morning of October 1 to go to Halim 
Perdan^ Kusumah Air Base, those responsible for escorting 
and guarding him were units of the Tjakrabirawa, who carried 
out their duty most effectively. "So too when I left Halim 
for Bogor, those who escorted me —  ’escorted* in the good 
sense of the word [mengawal in de goede betekenis van het 
woord] —  were the Tjakrabirawa. Also at this point I wish 
to stress once again that my departure to Bogor was at my 
own desire [atas kehendak saja sendiri] and not because of any 
pressure or threats."
President Sukarno emphasized that his trip to Bogor was 
taken by car [dengan kendaraan bermotor] and not by helicoDter.
Finally, the President also explained that as long as 
he was at Bogor and when he left Bogor for Djakarta on October 
9,units of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment were responsible for 
his personal security and that they performed their duties 
most efficiently.
7 . Comments bv the Tjakrabirawa Leadership on the Events of 
October 1. Published on October 14.
[The translation is based on an Antara report carried as a 
continuation of the story of the President’s October 14th 
interview. See Sinar Harapan, October 14, 1965.]
As to how the President/Great Leader of the Revolution 
escaped from treachery and danger, and managed to be secured 
and safeguarded at critical moments on October 1, the follow­
ing comments have been received from the leadership of the 
Tjakrabirawa Regiment.
Early in the morning of October 1 units dressed in Army 
uniform were nlaced around the Palace, as it were, encircling it.
The Tjakrabirawa leadership did not know the purpose 
behind the placement of these units, and since there were other 
susDicious signs, at about 6:00 a.m. Tjakrabirawa units im­
mediately took the rapid and firm decision to take the President/ 
Great Leader of the Revolution out of the Palace, and bring 
him to safety in a place they considered secure.
From this olace, and at his own desire, the President/
Great Leader of the Revolution left for Halim Perdanakusumah 
Air Base, escorted by units of the Tjakrabirawa, with the
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consideration that, should any undesirable eventualities 
occur, the Head of State could be immediately flown out to 
a safer place*
The Tjakrabirawa leadership emphasized that at that time 
no one knew for certain what had happened. Only later, when 
the President/Great Leader of the Revolution was in safety, 
did it become known that there were elements within the 
Tjakrabirawa corps involved in the counter-revolutionary 
adventure of the "September 30th Movement."
The President/Great Leader of the Revolution reached 
Halim Perdanakusumah Air Base at about 9:30 a.m. That night 
he left Halim Perdanakusumah Air Base. Tjakrabirawa units 
took the necessary actions for guarding and escorting him; at 
10:30 p.m., escorted by Tjakrabirawa units, the President 
left the Air Base by car. The President/Great Leader of the 
Revolution reached the Bogor Palace at about midnight, safe 
and sound [tanpa kurang suatu apa]. The whole move, from 
the Palace to tfa1im Perdanakusumah Air Base and on to Bogor, 
was carried out by car, and at no point was use made of the 
helicopter.
So long as the President/Great Leader of the Revolution 
was in the Bogor Palace (from midnight, October 1 to Satur­
day, October 9),security in and around the Palace was fully 
guaranteed, guard and escort functions being carried out by 
Tjakrabirawa units. At 9:15 a.m. on October 9, the President/ 
Great Leader of the Revolution left Bogor to return to Free­
dom Palace in Djakarta.
This time he travelled by helicopter, and escort and 
guard functions were again performed by Tjakrabirawa units.
In this connection the leadership of the Tjakrabirawa 
Regiment stressed that naturally the Tjakrabirawa Regiment 
was assisted in its security and escort duties bv units from 
the Armed Forces. Security movements in areas outside those 
for which the Tjakrabirawa Regiment was responsible were 
carried out by units of the Armed Forces in the closest coop­
eration and coordination with the Tjakrabirawa Regiment.
In this connection reference was made to the safeguarding 
and escorting of the children of President Sukarno during the 
crisis. At about *+:00 p.m. on October 1, the President’s 
children were taken from Freedom Palace to Kebajoran, and 
later on, to Halim Perdanakusumah Air Base. This operation 
was carried out by the Tjakrabirawa to guard against all 
possible eventualities. From Halim Perdanakusumah Air Base 
the President’s children were subsequentlv taken bv helicopter 
to Bandung. In Bandung escort and guard duty were assumed 
jointly bv units of the Tjakrabirawa, the Kudjang Battalion,
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the [Air Force] Pasukan Gerak Tjepat and the Mobile Brigade 
[Police].
All guard and escort assignments were performed in the 
best possible manner thanks to excellent cooperation between 
units of the different Armed Forces.
In conclusion the leadership of the Tjakrabirawa Regi­
ment stressed that not for one moment had the President/Great 
Leader of the Revolution ever been in the power of the 
so-called "September 30th Movement."
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IV. STATEMENTS BY THE INDONESIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP
1. First Army Broadcast After Recovering Control of the Djakarta 
Radio. As Broadcast at about 8:45 p.m. , October 1.
I The "translation is based on the Indonesian text found in 
Berita Yudha of October 2 and the English translation of the 
Djakarta Radio broadcast of 8:45 p.m., October 1.]
We express our gratitude to God Almighty that we, the 
Radio of the Republic of Indonesia, have been liberated from 
counter-revolutionary control by our armed forces,who have 
been constantly loyal and recognize only Bung Karno as the 
Great Leader of the Revolution.
We will now present an announcement.
Announcement No. 027/1965 of the Armv Information Center.
1. On October 1, 1965, an incident occurred which was 
carried out by a counter-revolutionary movement, which called 
itself the "September 30th Movement", in Djakarta.
2. They kidnapped a number of high officers, namely:
1. Lieutenant General A. Yani, 2. Major General Suprapto.
3. Major General S. Parman. 4. Major General Harjono M.T.
5. Brigadier General D.I. Pandjaitan. 6. Brigadier General 
Sutojo Siswomihardjo.
3. They were able by force to gain the use of the Djakarta 
Studio of RRI [Radio Republik Indonesia] and the Djakarta 
Central Telecommunications Office.
4. His Excellency, President/Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno, and 
his Honorable Minister Coordinator for Defense and Security/ 
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General A. H. Nasution, 
were able to be brought to safety and are in a safe and well 
condition.
5. The leadership of the Army is temporarily held by 
Major General Suharto, Commander of KOSTRAD.
6. The general situation is again under control and 
security measures are being actively carried out. The general 
public is urged to remain calm and continue their respective 
tasks as usual.
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2. Army Commander Suharto's Charge of Air Force Involvement 
in His Statement Hade Upon Discovery of the Bodies of the 
Generals on October 4 .
Lthe translation is based on the report in Berita Yudha of 
October 5 and English translation on Djakarta Radio broadcast 
on the evening of October 4.]
Today, October 4, 1965, we witnessed together, with our 
own eyes, the recovery of the bodies of our generals —  six 
generals —  and one junior officer from an old well. As you 
already know, our generals and our junior officers have fallen 
victims to the uncivilized actions of the adventurers of the 
so-called "September 30th Movement."
If we survey the place, it is in Lubang Buaja. Lubang 
Buaja is within the area of the Halim Air Base. Here you 
will also see that the area near the well has been used as 
a training center for volunteers under the auspices of the 
Air Force. The volunteers consisted of members of the Com­
munist Youth Group [Pemuda Rakjat] and of the Communist 
Women's Organization [Gerwani].
In a word, it is possible that they were undergoing 
training in the framework of the defense of the airbase.
But with the capture in Tjirebon of a member of Gerwani who 
had been trained here and who hails from Central Java, it 
is clear that they come from far away. Thus, based on these 
facts, it is possible that there is truth in the statement 
by our beloved President Bung Karno that the Air Force is 
not involved in the affair. But it is impossible that there 
is no involvement in this affair of elements of the Air 
Force.
For this reason, as a member of the Army, I would like 
to express the sentiment of patriots who are members of the 
Army: If it is true that there are elements who are involved
in the cruel killing of our innocent generals, I hope that 
Air Force patriots will purge such elements who are involved 
in this adventure.
I am very grateful that finally God gives clear guidance 
to us, that any dishonest action, that any bad action cer­
tainly will be suppressed. And I am grateful to units, 
particularly those from the paratroop regiment [RPKAD] and 
the marines [KKO] and other units,and the people who have 
assisted in the discovery of the well and the recovery of the 
bodies, so that the number of the victims could be determined. 
That is all.
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3. Speech by Major-General Suharto on October 15, 1965, 
To Central and Regional Leaders of the National Front.
Mr. Secretary-General, brothers from the National Front 
Central and Regional Leadership:
First of all I would like to thank you very much for the 
opportunity afforded me at today's meeting of the Central and 
Regional [leadership] of the National Front, and for the chance 
given me to convey certain explanations and clarifications, 
particularly about the task delegated to me by the President, 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Great Leader of the 
Revolution, in confronting the recent developments which we have 
all been experiencing and witnessing together in connection with 
the September 30th Movement. I would like to use this opportunity 
to pass on to you the facts as far as we know them, because I 
think that the facts will say more than I can, provided that we 
can evaluate those facts objectively. It will be up to you, my 
brothers, to make your own assessments - I shall simply try not 
to add or subtract anything from what I myself saw happening. I 
have no intention of influencing you all, my brothers, in making 
your own assessments of the facts which I experienced since 
October 1. Apart from giving you these facts myself, I [would 
like to request] time for other clarifications, since though I 
myself know some of the relevant facts, a number of my staff 
officers have also been able to collect some facts. I would like 
therefore to request time for my assistant, General Sutjipto, 
to give some explanations of his own.
Before I start I would like to ask your forgiveness, my 
brothers, for any lack of polish and coherence in my analysis, 
and also for any imperfections in my language - I am no expert 
at public speaking. I think we have a friend here who knows me, 
Mr. Harjo Sudirdjo,^) who is also from Jogja; Che knows that] I 
am someone who very rarely makes public statements, so that now 
that I am making a speech, especially to you, my brothers from the 
Central and Regional National Front leadership, this will more or 
less influence the rather disorganized form of what I have to 
say. So I ask your pardon in advance for any such deficiencies.
My brothers, very early in the morning of October 1, about 
5:30 a.m., I was visited by one of my neighbours. As I happen to
(1) The reference is to the Minister for Water Supply.
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be the head of the Rukun Tetangga^) in my kampung, he wanted to 
report to me - to fulfil his obligation as a Rukun Tetangga member 
to report if he heard or saw anything [unusualj. He told me that 
early that morning shots had been heard, that there had been 
shooting, and that they had heard that there had been kidnappings. 
Among other things he told me, he informed me that those who had 
been kidnapped included General Nasution, General Yani, General 
[SulPrapto, General Parman, General Harjono, General Pandjaitan, 
General Sutojo and also Pak Leimena; lastly he reported or informed 
me that (Air) Marshal Umar Dhani [sic] was also among those kid­
napped. Soon afterwards another neighbour came round to report
the same thing.
Their story was confirmed with the arrival of a General, a 
colleague of mine, a colleague from the Army, who gave me the 
same information. None of them, in giving their reports, had any 
idea of what, at that moment, was the fate of the kidnapped 
Generals.
So I was able to draw the conclusion that the Army leader­
ship could be said to be paralyzed. Since the Commander, the 
Minister/Commander, together with his Deputies and Assistants, had 
all been kidnapped, this meant that the Army had lost its leader­
ship. Therefore I took a decision - since I was convinced that 
if the Army, the largest element in the Armed Forces, was without 
its leadership, it would become still more confused, particularly 
confronted with a situation of this kind. Aside from the fact 
that it was normal practice, if the Minister/Commander of the 
Army went abroad, - normal practice since I was regarded as the 
senior officer after the Minister/Commander of the Army - for me 
to be appointed to represent him, (although functionally speaking 
it should have been the First or Second Deputy who represented 
him, the Minister decided that even if the First and Second 
Deputies were available, I would always be appointed to take his 
place as Minister/Commander of the Army when he was away) anyway, 
even aside from this normal practice, as an officer I realized that 
if any unit, even a small unit, let alone a large one, should be 
separated from its leadership, the consequence would be immediate 
chaos. 23
(2) The Rukun Tetangga are neighbourhood associations with various 
economic, security and intelligence functions.
(3) General Nasution is Defense Minister/Chief of Staff of the Armed 
Forces; and General Yani was Minister/Commander of the Army; 
General Suprapto was Second Deputy to the Minister/Commander
of the Army; General Parman was First Assistant (Intelligence) 
to the Minister/Commander of the Army; General Harjono was 
Third Deputy to the Minister/Commander of the Army; General 
Pandjaitan was Fourth Assistant (Logistics) to the Minister/ 
Commander of the Army; General Sutojo was Auditor-General and 
Law Inspector of the Army; Dr. Leimena is Second Deputy Prime 
Minister/Coordinating Minister for Distribution; Air Vice 
Marshal Omar Dhani was Minister/Commander of the Air Force.
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Therefore, urged on by a desire that, since the Army is also 
an instrument of the Revolution which must always be ready to 
render service to the State, to the Revolution, to the Great Leader 
of the Revolution, every effort should be made to ensure that this 
very considerable force retain its leadership, without hesitation 
I decided on my own to assume leadership of the Army, so long as 
we remained in the dark about the fate of the Minister, the 
honorable Minister of the Army,
Since it was still very early, and so my chauffeur had not 
yet arrived, I was forced to drive myself in a Jeep to Headquarters, 
KOSTRAD headquarters, where indeed I was stationed as KOSTRAD 
Commander.^4 5' On reaching Headquarters, I learnt that several 
of my Staff officers had already arrived, since it was already 
almost 7:00 a.m., or at least well after 6:30 a.m. I therefore 
immediately collected my Staff together. It turned out that 
among all my Staff officers, there was not one who knew anything 
about the affair. In fact the affair was very alarming [mengedjutkan] 
for all of us, both for the KOSTRAD people and for the Army in 
general.
Since there was in Djakarta an officer with direct respon­
sibility for security - the Commander of the Fifth (Djaya)
Territorial Command - I contacted him,^^ and learned that he 
had visited the various places where the events [kidnappings] had 
occurred, and had then gone straight to the Palace to see His 
Excellency the President. However he did not get to meet the 
President himself, but he did encounter or rather observed that 
General Supardjo was inside the Palace. I should explain that 
General Supardjo was actually Commander of the Fourth Combat 
Command, in fact within the Confrontation framework he was in 
command of the Fourth Combat Command of KOSTRAD, and should have 
been at his post in West Kalimantan. They had set up their 
command post there in West Kalimantan, near Menggaian. As KOSTRAD 
Commander and as Deputy Commander of the Mandala Preparedness 
Command - in the first case having direct administrative respon­
sibility for directing or preparing KOSTRAD units, and in the 
second case having direct tactical command - I was rather 
startled to learn that General Supardjo had come to Djakarta at 
all, let alone that he was at the Palace very early in the morning, 
without letting either KOSTRAD or the Mandala Preparedness Command 
know beforehand, and especially myself as Deputy Commander of 
the Mandala Preparedness Command.
At this point, having received General Umarfs report and 
explanation, I informed him, I told him clearly that I was taking 
over leadership of the Army. He agreed, and I then issued my 
first command and instruction to him as Commander of the Djaya
(4) KOSTRAD is the Army Strategic Reserve Command.
(5) This was Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah.
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Territorial Command. My first order was that all troops be con­
signed to their quarters. No one was to go out without direct 
orders from me. If in the framework of restoring security it 
should prove necessary [for anyone] to leave their quarters, they 
must wear civilian clothes. This was intended to prevent mis­
understanding [simpang siurnja] between various units, since we 
still did not know who was friend and who foe. The main idea 
was thus to avoid the possibility of shooting breaking out till 
we knew for sure who was friend and who foe. This order was then 
carried out by the Djaya Territorial Commander.
I then tried to contact the Navy.^6 78  ^ Now it happened that 
the First Deputy of the Minister/Commander of the Navy was also 
a Deputy Commander of the Mandala Preparedness Command, so that 
there was already good coordination between Admiral Muljadi and 
myself. In a very short time he came round to KOSTRAD Headquarters. 
After I had explained the whole situation, he proposed and agreed 
that for the time being I should assume command, and that [the 
Navy] would give its fullest support to the Army in overcoming 
and settling the present situation. Since I had now been given 
authority to coordinate all Navy activities, I issued instructions 
like those [I had given to Umar]. All [Navy personnel] must be 
consigned to barracks. No one was to go out without direct orders 
from me. If compelled to leave [their quarters] to help restore 
order and security, civilian clothes must be worn.
Thirdly, I made contact with the Police. I could not get 
through directly to the Police Department, but I did succeed via 
the [Djakarta] Police Chief.(7) j did what I had done before 
with the Navy, and the Police Chief finally agreed to centralize 
all police movements, allowing me to coordinate police movements 
for the whole of the Djakarta area.
The one Force with which I had difficulty in making contact 
was the Air Force. I took the step of sending some liaison 
officers to Halim, because I knew several Air Force officers within 
the framework of the Mandala Preparedness Command. I did get in
contact with various Air Force officers, particularly Commodore 
Leo, but not as smoothly as with the Navy and Police.^8' In the
(6) It is worth noting that the Minister/Commander of the Navy 
Vice Admiral R. Eddy Martadinata, does not appear to have 
been contacted by Suharto.
(7) It is worth noting that the Minister/Commander of the Police, 
Police Inspector General Sutjipto Judodihardjo, does not appear 
to have been contacted by Suharto. The Coihmander of the Vllth 
Police Region (Greater Djakarta) was Police Brig. Gen. Sawarno 
Tjokrodiningrat, appointed June 8, 1965. He was removed from 
this post shortly after the coup.
(8) Air Commodore Leo Wattimena was Commander of the Air Force 
Operations Command, Halim Perdanakusumah Air Base, and Chief 
of Staff of the Mandala Preparedness Command.
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case of the Navy and Police, once their leaderships had been 
contacted, they placed liaison officers at KOSTRAD HQ to 
facilitate relationships and to exchange whatever information 
each force received about what had happened. Thus it was only 
with the Air Force that there was some footdragging in setting 
up doordination that morning. The affair had still not developed 
to the point where we knew who was friend and who foe.
Still early in the morning, after I had made contact with 
the various Armed Services, I received word that General Nasution 
had been rescued - it was about 8:00 a.m. when I heard this - 
and was now in a [safe] place. Secondly I got information that 
Air Marshal Umar Dhani [sic], who according to the first reports 
had been kidnapped, had actually been taken to safety [diselamatkan] 
by his own men [anak buah] at about 3:00 a.m., i.e. about one 
hour before the affair broke out - since the affair occurred 
roughly between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m.
At the same time I gave orders to collect as much informa­
tion as possible; and so we learnt (and indeed I myself already 
knew) that the troops around the Palace were units wearing green 
berets.
The [only] units in Djakarta wearing green berets were 
Battalions 454 from Central Java and 530 from East Java. I 
should explain here that these units were [in Djakarta] to con­
tribute to the grandeur of the Armed Forces Twentieth Anniversary. 
In other words they were not units on strictly military assign­
ment [bukan kesatuan jang diperintahkan], but [because] the 
President wanted the Armed Forces Twentieth Anniversary to be 
celebrated on a grandiose scale [dengan meriah].
The Army was to display the formation it regularly puts on 
in the framework of a ’’show of forces” [sic]; it was going to 
demonstrate the formation of a full infantry combat brigade with 
supporting units - 3 battalions of foot, plus 1 tank, 1 armored 
(panzer), 1 mortar, 1 anti-aircraft and 1 engineers1 unit. Thus 
[the idea was] to display the formation of a ’’strengthened” Army 
Infantry Brigade for the commemoration of the Anniversary.
Once we knew that the troops in the areas around the main 
intersections^9' were wearing green berets, I summoned the Brigade 
Commander and demanded an explanation as to why these green beret 
troops from his Brigade were stationed around the Palace. Now 
it happened that I myself had held an Inspection of this Brigade 
on [September] the 30th, with its [constituent] battalions, as 
part of the preparations for the Twentieth Anniversary display.
In fact I even had an appointment to watch a training-rehearsal
(9) The text is confused here, literally reading: ’’setelah kami 
mengetahui bahwa jang berada disekitar lapang dj“alan silang 
kesatuan2' baret hidjau. ...1
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on October 1st itself, in which these troops were supposed to be 
ready at Senajan Stadium by 6:30 a.m. The Brigade Commander 
answered my request for an explanation by reporting that the 
units of his Infantry Brigade were fully mustered, except for 
two battalions which had still not shown up, i.e. Battalions *454 
and 5 30,, which now proved to be stationed in front of the Palace 
and around the Istana Negara.(10)
Meanwhile, still quite early, as we were trying to gather 
as clear information as possible, the first announcement by 
former Lieutenant Colonel Untung, Commander of the 1st 
Tjakrabirawa Battalion, was heard, saying that they were mounting 
a movement called the September 30th Movement, to take action 
against a Council of Generals who were about to undertake a coup, 
and that this movement was intended to safeguard the Revolution.(ID 
This was the first real news that we had heard; from it we were 
able to conclude that this 1 Movement’ was a movement to paralyze 
what, according to them, was a movement by a Council of Generals 
to execute a coup.
As a member of the Army, I naturally knew better what the 
real situation within the Army was. The accusational^) that a 
Council of Generals existed, which was on the point of carrying 
out a coup, made no sense at all to me, and so I drew the con­
clusion that these "bulletins" and "reasons" were simply concocted 
justifications.
The Council of Generals which they mentioned simply did not 
exist, let alone one which was organizing a coup. The truth is 
that within the Army there is a Council on Posts and Ranks for 
Senior Officers, abbreviated as WANDJABTI. ^ ^ ) Its task is, 
every year as Proclamation Day comes around, to consider the 
promotions of Colonels to the rank of General; and this Council, 
this WANDJABTI, is headed by General Sudirman/1*+) with myself as 
Vice-Chairman. So I knew quite clearly that if what they meant
(10) The Presidential Palace is actually compounded of two separate 
buildings, back to back, separated by a large garden. The 
Istana Merdeka (Freedom Palace) looks south onto Djl. Merdeka 
Utara and Merdeka Square. The Istana Negara (State Palace) 
looks north onto Djl. Segara.
(11) This broadcast was made at approximately 7:15 a.m. over 
Radio Djakarta.
(12) The printed word is tudjuan (aim, intention). This seems 
to be a misprint for tuduhan (accusation).
(13) This abbreviation stands for Dewan Djabatan dan Pangkatan 
Perwira Tinggi.
(1H) General Sudirman is head of the Army Staff and Command School.
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by the Council of Generals was this Council WANDJABTI, then it 
had absolutely no intention whatever, let alone any plans for 
making a seizure [of power] or a coup. If what they meant was 
the group of Generals on the General Staff (SUAD), who acted as 
advisers to the Minister/Commander of the Army in leading the 
Army and situating [menempatkan] it as an instrument of the 
Revolution, then so far as I knew, there was absolutely no think­
ing in the direction of making a coup or seizing power. That 
was why, quite frankly, I decided that these actions(15) were 
basically provocative. Thus one of the first things to make 
me suspicious of the "Movement" was the justification it gave 
for itself.
The second announcement contained the formation of the 
Revolution Council, and then further declared that the Dwikora 
Cabinet was "demissionary"; it also made no mention whatever of 
the Great Leader of the Revolution.(16) go I said quite con­
fidently that these were the ones who were making and carrying 
out a coup; and now they were being unmasked. On the basis of 
our analysis of the information contained in their announcements, 
we now understood, we could understand the objective of the 
"Movement" as being none other than a coup. Secondly, we could 
now separate who was friend and who foe. The foe was,first of 
all, Battalions 454 and 530 and the 1st Tjakrabirawa Battalion, 
who were all involved at that point - these were the [only]
Army units that we knew of as such. Now after the announcement 
of a Revolution Council led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the 
Air Force leadership issued a statement that the Air Force fully 
supported the "Movement" and the Revolution Council. (1*7) Various 
indications I had already received - first, the difficulty I 
had in coordinating the Air Force, second the fact that the top 
leadership had been "taken to safety" before the affair broke 
out, and third, the present statement of support - well even a 
fool would have been able to tell that these [the Air Force] 
must be classed with the foe that we had now to face.
Once we had learnt what their objectives were, and who was 
friend and who foe, we had to try to ensure by all possible means 
that there be no shooting and bloodshed. Therefore our first
(15) The word used, tindakan2, (actions), is an odd one to use 
to describe radioannouncements.
(16) The second Untung broadcast was made at 2:00 p.m., October 1. 
fDemissionary! is a technical word used to describe the 
status of a defeated Government under a parliamentary system, 
which acts as a caretaker prior to the formation of a new 
Government. A singular term, by any account, to be employed 
in this context.
(17) This Air Force statement was signed by Omar Dhani at 9:30 a.m., 
October 1, at Halim Airbase. It was announced over Djakarta 
Radio at 3:30 p.m. that same afternoon.
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move, after discovering that among the units being used by the 
"Movement" there were Battalions(18) from KOSTRAD itself, was 
[for me to] order the Brigade Commander to contact his Battalion 
Commanders. (It was still early in the morning). -They [Brigade 
HQ] sent couriers(19) to the Battalion Commanders, but the 
Commanders of Battalions 454 and 530 were already inside the 
Palace, so that they wouldn’t obey my orders.(20) Now since I 
knew that if they were inside the Palace, actual control [over 
their troops] would have been turned over to their Deputies,
I ordered these [last] to be contacted. Finally, the Deputy 
Commanders reported to me in person [langsung menghadap pada saja]. 
First I explained [my own position], and then asked them what 
their assignment was, stationed around the Palace. They answered 
that they had a special task, guarding the Great Leader of the 
Revolution, because, they said, the Council of Generals was 
about to launch a coup.
This [the following] is the gist of what I told them, and 
of the answers which the Deputy Commanders of Battalions 454 and 
530 gave to my questions. I asked whether they had heard the 
announcements'21) Df this Revolution Council, particularly the 
one led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung. They said they had.(22)
Then we asked them if they had ever had any knowledge of a 
Council of Generals launching a coup. [They said,] No. [We 
pointed out] that now the Revolution Council had dissolved 
[membubarkan](23) the Dwikora Cabinet and, furthermore, had not 
included the name of the Great Leader of the Revolution in the 
composition of the Revolution Council - indeed had not even men­
tioned it - and asked them: Is this a coup or isn't it? They
said: Yes, they are carrying out a coup. [I said:] In that case
(18) The text is ambiguous. It is not clear whether what is meant 
is Battalion or Battalions.
(19) The text is ambiguous. It is not clear whether what is meant 
is courier or couriers.
(20) The Commanders of Battalions 454 and 530 were, respectively, 
Major Sukirno and Major Bambang Supeno.
(21) This is an unambiguous plural, and so places these manoeuvres 
in time after the 2:00 p.m. Untung broadcasts - at least 
according to Suharto.
(22) The Indonesian text is awkward and confused: "Kemudian saja
tanjakan, apakah mereka telah mendengar pengumuman2 dari 
Dewan Revolusi ini, terutama jang dipimpin oleh Let. Kol. 
Untung, mereka mendengar."
(23) This is not strictly true. The Cabinet was given "care­
taker" status, but not dissolved. But doubtless Suharto 
felt that the niceties of parliamentary procedure would be 
wasted on the Company Commanders.
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you have been tricked into [thinking you are] guarding the 
President, but actually you have been manipulated [diperalat] 
into protecting the activities of this coup movement"! I told 
them: you’ve been used good and proper. Now if you’re really
still loyal to the Revolution and to the Soldier’s Oath, Sapta 
Mafrga, go and collect your men and come back here to report to 
me. If you don’t, I’ll be forced to take drastic action, since 
you’ve already clearly assisted a movement which is endangering 
our State and Revolution.
Finally the two Company Commanders agreed, and went back 
to their men. I also had the help of certain senior officers 
at that time, and also of several middle-ranking officers who 
came to me, and who were well acquainted with units in or 
individual members of the two Battalions, possibly they had been 
former commanding officers of the Battalions. I ordered them to 
take off their Generals’ uniforms and go in civilian dress to 
explain the situation to their old subordinates. As a result, 
after about two hours, Battalion 530 was assembled and brought 
by truck to report to me. In other words, we had now managed 
to rescue one Battalion from this affair. Our "subtraction*1 
[lit. "the loss"] of one Battalion (i.e. Battalion 530) was 
accomplished with the aid of the Commander of the Eighth Terri­
torial Division, who was at KOSTRAD at that time.(2*0 Tn the 
case of Battalion 454, while the Deputy Commander of this 
Battalion was briefing his Company Commanders, the Battalion 
Commander himself came out of the Palace and resumed command of 
the Battalion; [this meant] that the Deputy Commander could not 
carry on with his briefing and explanation to the Company Com­
manders. So that what had been accomplished with Battalion 530 
could not be carried out in the case of Battalion 454. Nonethe­
less I continued my efforts because I learnt - after some [time], 
about half a day - I got information that ... in fact there was 
also a courier, an adjutant of the President, who came to ask me 
how the situation was.(25)
I [now] knew that the President was no longer in the Palace, 
but in a certain place. I used this information to make another 
effort to make Battalion 454 realize the futility [lit. "the 
mistakenness" - kekeliruan] of the task they had been assigned.
I was able to make contact with the Palace, with a member of the 
Tjakra regimental staff, and I ordered him to contact the Company 
Commanders and the Deputy Commander of the Battalion and bring 
them into the Palace. As they were assigned to protect the
(24) This was Major General Basuki Rachmat.
(25) Unluckily this vital sentence is extremely obscure in the 
Indonesian: "...karena saja mengetahui setelah beberapa 
kira2setengah hari saja mendapat info dan djuga memang ada 
kurir adjudan daripada kapak Fresiden menemui saja untuk
menanj akan mengenai keadaannja."
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Great Leader of the Revolution, this would convince them that 
he was not in the Palace, and thus their guard duty around the 
Palace was simply a waste of time. These officers were indeed 
then brought into the Palace, and once convinced that the Great 
Leader of the Revolution was not there, they withdrew and col­
lected their men together in the Gedung Pemuda.(26) gut apparently 
they were too late for the time limit I had set, and so they took 
off for Halim as a complete unit [keseluruhannja].
Under the circumstances the most important [installations] 
round the Palace were the RRI building and the Post-and-Telecom- 
munications building.(27) These we managed to secure without 
any shooting, since I had in fact given [them] an ultimatum: if 
they did not vacate RRI by 8:00 p.m., we would be compelled to 
take it by force with troops that we had gotten ready for that 
purpose. But Thanks be to God, all went [smoothly] without any 
use of force.(28)
My brothers, why was it that I had to sacrifice RRI to be 
used by them [from morning] till evening? I was well aware that 
if they were allowed to use the RRI to announce their activities, 
of course from the political point of view we would suffer great 
harm, especially as this would give the public the impression 
that there existed another authority than the authority of the 
Government under the leadership of the Great Leader of the Revolu­
tion. I realized the harm that we would suffer, but I was con­
vinced that the effort to diminish their [military] strength would 
more [rapidly] ensure the successful settlement of the affair.
I gave top priority to avoiding bloodshed, and Thanks be to 
God too, since [otherwise] I could have seized the RRI by force 
early in the morning after the first announcement. But this 
would have resulted in shooting, and I still did not know the 
real background to this "Movement" at that time. But once the 
announcement of the Revolution Council and its composition had 
been made, their real activities were unmasked [sic], convincing 
us that we no longer need hesitate to take action against the 
September 30th Movement, and could determine who was friend and 
who foe. By late afternoon [sore hari] all the [rebel] troop
(26) The Gedung Pemuda (Youth Building) is close to the Istana 
Merdeka, a little to the east along Djl. Merdeka Utara. It 
also looks out on Merdeka Square.
(27) The RRI (Djakarta Radio) building is on Djl. Merdeka Barat, 
on the west side of Merdeka Square. The Post-and-Telecom- 
munications Building is on Djl. Merdeka Selatan, at the 
south end of the same square.
(28) The coup group went* off the air shortly after 6:00 p.m. and 
the RRI building was evidently in the hands of Suharto's 
paratroopers by 7:00 p.m.
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units - with the exception of the Tjakra who were still inside 
the Palace and whom we had contacted earlier, were withdrawn to 
Halim. This was still another indication to us that the Air 
Force formed the basis [sic] of the "Movement." This at least 
was my evaluation of the situation, [in connection] with various 
facts, from morning till 6:00 p.m.(29)
Some time after 6:00 p.m., i.e. getting on for 7:00 p.m., 
Battalion 530 was given the task of securing, among other things, 
the area round the National Front building,'30) thus the area 
behind and to the South of that building. Apparently the youth 
organizational) did not realize that we had already taken over, 
so they came in an armed gang to occupy the National Front build­
ing. Now since this gang consisted of youths whom we still 
could not identify, we disarmed them and took away their weapons.
It turned out that they were from the Pemuda Rakjat, and were 
carrying weapons from the Air Force, this we learnt from sub­
sequent interrogations. They told us that the Air Force had 
distributed 3,000 arms all told, [and the Army](32) several 
hundred, in various parts of Djakarta. As a soldier I was naturally 
very concerned that 3,000 arms were in the hands of people who 
were not members of the Armed Forces; this already represented 
a force which could create disorder, especially as I had already 
listed the Air Force among our foes, considering their activities 
up to this point.
On the basis of the reports that we had received and the 
facts we had assembled, there seemed good reason to believe that 
the early morning of October 2nd would witness even more violent 
events: possibly a general attack or an [attempt to] take back
the area around the Palace. As a soldier of course I knew that 
one should always anticipate the enemy rather than allow oneself 
to be anticipated by him. So, in order to avoid the possibility 
of still further trouble and confusion on October 2nd, I decided 
that we must take control of Halim that very night.
(29) The Indonesian is awkward: "Ini adalah penilaian saja pada
waktu itu, dengan beberapa fakta2 mulai pagi sampai dengan 
dJa'm~T8":'P ti '.~T1------------ ----------------------------------
(30) The National Front building (the old Vice-Presidential 
residence) lies a little to the west of the Post-and-Tele- 
communications building on Djl. Merdeka Selatan.
(31) The transition here is very abrupt, since no youth groups 
have been mentioned up to this point. This is also, with 
one exception, the sole reference to Communist-affiliated 
organizations in the entire speech.
(32) For this insertion, see page 175.
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My brothers, I said just now that the President had been 
at Halim since early morning - we had heard it from his adjutant. 
Actually at that time [when the adjutant appeared], the President 
was summoning various Army officers, i.e. General Pranoto and 
General Umar. All of them had already reported to me.(33) I 
told the adjutant in reply that he should report to the President 
that I had assumed provisional leadership of the Army, that I 
had been able to get the situation under control, and that I 
requested further instructions. As for the Generals who had been 
summoned, I forbade them to go, since, quite frankly, in my estima­
tion Halim was the centre of the "Movement" and I did not want to 
lose any more Generals. So it was because of my suspicions 
[ketjurigaan] that I did not permit them to go.
My conclusion at that point then was that the President was 
secure [aman] - but whether 'secure* meant 'secure' or 'secured' 
[diamankanJ was something I had to figure out in relation to 
the facts available at that time. Later on that evening, about 
8:00 p.m., another courier came from the President, an adjutant 
of his, asking for explanations. So I explained everything to 
him. Then the adjutant asked me: What task does Pak Suharto 
give me to perform? I told him, I said: The task you must per­
form is to move Bapak [the President] from Halim. I then repeated 
it: The task you must now carry out as adjutant is to move
[pindahkan] Bapak from Halim. I will be very thankful to God 
if you can manage to move [dapat memindahkan] Bapak from Halim. 
Evidently the adjutant understood what I meant [mengetahui maksud 
saja], and later did his utmost, since about 10:00 p.m. 1 got 
a longdistance call from Bogor that the President had already 
arrived there.(34) But I checked this through a Bogor man,
Colonel Alex, telling him to go into the Palace; and indeed the 
President was already there.(35) i thank God that in regaining 
control of Halim it was not necessary for me to take the President 
out of Halim by force [mengambil dulu Bapak dengan kekerasan dari 
Halim], but that he was already out of Halim, so that now all 
that remained was seizing control of Halim.
Although I had already made plans to retake Halim, my 
brothers, I knew that obviously not everyone there was involved 
in the affair; supposing that I destroyed [menghantjurkan] Halim, 
who would suffer? I myself would feel that I had suffered [rugi], 
we all would. Therefore, the assignment I gave to the tank unit 
which I formed to retake Halim was: I told them strictly to
avoid any shooting if they could help it, and avoid damaging
(33) General Pranoto Reksosamudro was then Third Assistant (Per­
sonnel) to the Minister/Commander of the Army. General Umar 
Wirahadikusumah was Commander of the Fifth (Greater Djakarta) 
Territorial Division.
(34) The President's week-end Palace is in Bogor, forty miles 
south of Djakarta.
(35) Colonel Alex is otherwise unidentified.
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airplanes and buildings, since they were our [Indonesia's] prop­
erty. For this reason the counter-attack had to be carried out 
by night. Actually if we were to execute a conventional crushing 
of the "Movement," since there was a tank force all ready to go - 
as I said before, in the framework of the Armed Forces Anniversary 
we had already collected together 1 tank company (22 tanks) and 
1 company of armor (panzers) - if we trained all 22 tanks on 
Halim, I think there is no doubt that we could have destroyed it 
completely. But as a citizen and also as a member of the Army 
and partner to the other Armed Services, I did not want [any­
thing], and especially the Air Force, to be completely destroyed - 
since after all it was our property. So I specially selected 
troops who could carry out the assignment: to infiltrate and 
execute a night attack. Finally, at 6:10 p.m.^6)we managed 
to get full control of Halim without firing a shot. The one 
incident which did occur was when early in the morning a water- 
buffalo got upset seeing the red berets of the RPKAD(37) and 
our people were forced to shoot it.
Thus if there was no move, there was actually no shooting. 
And that, my brothers, was the situation, when about 6:10 a.m. 
it was reported to me that the situation at Halim was now under 
control. There also occurred various incidents in a number of 
places, among others near Senajan and around the Hotel Indonesia. 
At the same time we managed to seize some weapons - indeed we 
had formed a special unit for the seizure of weapons - and we 
did manage to take some arms away from them.
Anyway, while we were still preparing our attack on Halim, 
that is, after the President/Great Leader of the Revolution had 
left the airbase, there was some activity - airplanes taking off. 
Since we had radar-equipment attached to each anti-aircraft unit, 
we checked up, and discovered how many planes landed and how many 
took off.(38; At that time there was a plane landing, a Jetstar 
which was supposed to pick up Pak Bandrio,(39) [though] this 
didn't work out, and did carry Air Marshal Sri Muljono
(36) The text has 18:10 hours. This is incorrect; compare the 
time of the water-buffalo story, and the time given in the 
first part of the succeeding paragraph.
(37) The RPKAD (Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat) is the 
Army's crack commando regiment.
(38) The Indonesian is very confusing: "...ada kegiatan2 pesawat 
jang naik jang sesudah kita tjek karena kita mempunjai 
radarnja, daripada semua satuan penangkis udara hingga kita 
inengetahui berapa pesawat jang naik dan berapa pesawat jang 
turun."
(39) Dr. Subandrio, who was at that moment in Medan.
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Herlambang. (^0) And since he possibly did not know,^!) we were 
forced to fire at him with our anti-aircraft guns. So, if you 
heard firing about 12 midnight, it was anti-aircraft guns shoot­
ing at a plane coming in to land at Halim. However the plane 
was not touched, and finally managed to land safely.
That same night there were also planes taking off; we 
tried to estimate whether they were planes going to fetch 
reinforcements or for subversion. It turned out later that 
they were carrying out an evacuation: from Halim to Jogja,
and then on to Madiun, Maospati.<^2)
About mid-day [siang hari], [or rather] in the morning 
[pagi hari], I was summoned by the President together with the 
Commanders of all the other Armed Services, and, from the Army, 
General PraptoO+3) and General Murs id. (  ^ ) Actually it was 
early morning when I was summoned, but because I was still very 
busy with General Umar, organizing and taking control of the 
situation in the city, it was only after 1:00 p.m. that I left 
for Bogor. I left for Bogor about 1:00 p.m., and got there at 
4:00 p.m. A meeting was immediately held. The others, i.e. 
the Commanders, thus the Commander of the Police; the Commander 
of the Navy with some of his officers; the President; Pak Leimena 
from the Air Force, Commander Herlambang; Minister Tardhio^^); 
Minister of Trade Jusuf^G); and one other, General Sabur, as 
KOTI secretary, (47) had all been waiting for me for a long time.
(•+0) Herlambang was at the time Deputy Commander of the Air Force
(41) The Indonesian is obscure: "karena mungkin djuga dia tidak 
tahu, terpaksa djuga pula ditembak...♦" Probably Suharto 
means that Herlambang did not know that the Army was trying 
to prevent all air traffic in and out of Halim airbase.
(42) Maospati is the large Air Force base near the city of Madiun
(43) This is a curious mistake. General (Soe)prapto, the Second 
Deputy to the Minister/Commander of the Army, was one of the 
six generals kidnapped and killed on the morning of October
1. Clearly Suharto means General Pranoto, not Prapto.
(44) General Mursid was and is First Deputy to the Minister/Com­
mander of the Army.
(45) Minister Tardhio is Attorney-General Brigadier General R. 
Sutardhio.
(46) Minister Jusuf is Minister of External Trade, Brigadier 
General A. Jusuf.
(47) Brigadier General Sabur was and is Commander of the 
Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the Presidential Bodyguard. He is 
also secretary to the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI).
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As soon as I arrived, therefore, the meeting was immediately 
started. A little while after the President opened the [dis­
cussions], Air Marshal Umar [sic] Dhani and Commodore Leo 
[Wattimena] appeared, late, because they had had to come a 
long way.(48)
At this meeting the President explained that he was well 
aware, and understood, that this Affair was one which had to be 
settled immediately. It was a political affair which had to be 
settled immediately in the political field. For this the President 
[said he] required the restoration of calm and tranquillity. He 
gave orders that his original decision taking over direct control 
of the Army and appointing an Army officer, General Pranoto, as 
day-to-day caretaker of the Army should be put into effect. I 
was asked if this could be done. I answered that the President's 
order could [indeed] be carried out immediately; if it were 
announced, I would retract all the announcements I had made as 
temporary leader of the Army, [so that] the President and the 
day-to-day caretaker could perform their tasks.(49) [However] 
apparently the President did not want this to be done [tidak 
menghendaki daripada pelaksanaan tsb.], but wished me to continue 
carrying out the restoration of security and order. Since there 
was some question about the status of his [original] order,(50) 
the President finally gave a radio address explaining the exist­
ence of this order and affirming the task I had been given, as 
KOSTRAD Commander, to restore order and security. These are the 
facts up to October 2.
The tasks given me by His Excellency the President were: 
first, to make every effort to avoid bloodshed, especially 
between the Army and the Air Force. I told him that this could 
be guaranteed and carried out. Second, I was to secure all arms 
in the hands of people who were not members of the Armed Forces. 
Last night in my report,(51) I explained that there were about
(48) Evidently from Central Java.
(49) The Indonesian is a little obscure: "...perintah daripada 
Bapak Presiden bisa dilaksanakan segera bilamana diumumkan 
saja akan mentjabut segala pengumuman saja sebagai pimpinan 
sementara A.D. jang kemudian baik Presiden, caretaker' 
harian bisa melakukan tugasnja.*'
(50) The Indonesian is rather obscure: "Karena dasar dari perintah 
beliau ada tidak ada achirnja diadakan pidato....*'
(51) Again an obscurity. The Indonesian is: "Tadi malam laporan 
saja, saja djelaskan...." The implication is that Suharto 
made a report to Soekarno on October 1. But it is possible 
that this is an aside and Suharto is referring to a report 
he made on October 14, i.e. the night before his present 
speech to the National Front officials.
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3,000 arms from the Air Force, and about 200 from the Army, 
which had been removed by the followers of the September 30th 
Movement. These then were the two tasks which I was given:
1) fighting, clashes between one Armed Service and another, 
particularly between the Army and the Air Force, must be pre­
vented at all costs. This I said we could manage. 2) We must 
take back [all] arms in the hands of people outside the Armed 
Forces. I said I could guarantee this too, but it would take 
some time, since we did not know precisely where these arms 
were.
My brothers, after we had reported on October 1,(52) we 
naturally did our best to discover the fate of our kidnapped 
Generals. So on the evening of October 1, - the eve of October 
2 - our troops, who had carried out a successful manoeuvre with­
out any shots being fired, were withdrawn, precisely in order to 
avoid shooting between the Air Force and ourselves.(53) i gave 
orders to look for scouts,(54) [to hunt down] clues as to the 
fate of our Generals. By God’s Grace, that very night we already 
received some indications -- there were some points that we got 
to know, on the basis of reports from people who knew what had 
happened. That same night too, moves were made to hunt for 
them; and finally we found the place of execution of our Generals 
It was in a spot at the edge of the Lubang Buaja (Crocodile Hole) 
district which is part of the Halim Air Base. Nearby there was 
a training-ground, with tents set up by the Air Force for train­
ing members of the Pemuda Fakjat and Gerwani. They had already 
held about three training-courses there.
On October 3, I gave instructions that it should be under­
stood that the exhumations of the bodies would take place only 
at my orders. On the morning of October 4 we exhumed the bodies 
It proved to be true that the bodies of all 6 Generals and one 
officer, the adjutant of the Minister/Chief of Staff of the
(52) See previous footnote. It is not clear to whom Suharto 
reported if it was not Soekarno.
(53) This is further confirmation that Halim did not fall to 
Suharto till the morning of October 2. But the syntax 
is exceedingly awkward.
(54) The Indonesian is: ,f...saja perintahkan mentjari penjelusur, 
dimana bekas2 daripada nasib daripada Djenderal2 kita.1T 
Penjelusur would mean "slider,rr which makes no sense. 
Penjelusup means "scout" or "infiltrator." The sense is 
then somewhat improved, although one still requires a verb 
between penjelusup and dimana, and it is odd that Suharto 
would give orders to look for scouts. The best solution 
would be men jelusup, with the sense then beinp;: "I gave 
orders to look for, to scout out clues as to the fate....
But this would mean two separate misprints in one word.
it
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Armed Forces,(55) ^ad been put into a dry well. It appears that 
[the executioners] really thought and believed that the bodies 
would not be discovered, since the well was closed and the hole 
at the top was filled in solid, so that, as it were, nothing 
would show. However, with the indications that we had we were 
finally able to find this well, as has been reported in the news­
papers. We had to do it [this way] because of the Presidents 
instructions, among other things, to avoid clashes between the 
Army and the Air Force. On the other hand, it would obviously 
be very hard and difficult to control our boys1 fury [once they 
knew what had happened], even though the President had given his 
second radio address in which he explained that he himself was 
safe and held the top leadership,(56; and that furthermore the 
Air Force was not involved in the affair [so that] shooting 
between the Air Force and the Army must be avoided.(57)
Finally,in order to put a curb [mengekang] on actions which 
might get out of control, I felt compelled to issue a statement 
on the spot, the contents of which confirmed^8) the President’s 
[declaration] that the Air Force was not involved, but [noted] 
that on the basis of the [known] facts it was impossible that 
some Air Force elements were not involved. Therefore I urged 
the Air Force to take immediate action against those elements 
involved in the affair. My aim was to keep a tight rein on 
undisciplined acts by our own boys, and also to induce the Air 
Force to take a firm attitude, clearly distinguishing between 
right and wrong.(59) Thanks be to God, we were able to control
(55) The Minister/Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces was and is 
General Abdul Haris Nasution. His adjutant was Pierre 
Tendean.
(56) Suharto says: "memimpin tapuk pimpinan" - lead the top 
leadership. This is a clear mistake for memegang tapuk 
pimpinan" - held the top leadership.
(57) The Indonesian syntax is very odd: "...bahwa AUFI tidak 
terlibat dalam soal ini harus didjauhkarT tembak menembak 
an tar a AURI dan AD.
(58) The Indonesian word translated by "confirmed" is actually 
membenarkan, which literally means "declares to be correct" 
with a certain overtone of superiority on the part of
the declarer.
(59) The Indonesian: "...memisahkan mana jang salah dan mana 
jang benar," can mean Hdistinguish between right and 
wrong, but it can also mean "distinguish between those 
who are in the right and those who are in the wrong."
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our , so that there were no undisciplined acts of revenge,
e t C •
My brothers, you can all imagine the fury of a soldier 
once he learned what had happened. Perhaps an officer could be 
controlled, but an ordinary soldier would be very hard to 
restrain. But by explanations and briefings in accordance with 
the Great Leader of the Revolution's wish that we be magnanimous, 
we managed to convince our men to be magnanimous too and [abandon] 
all desire for revenge towards anyone. This was especially 
[facilitated] once we discovered that the Air Force as an organ 
[of state] was not involved, only some Air Force elements. [But] 
all these elements had to be hunted down, and [so] we left this 
up to the Air Force itself; there was no need for us to intervene 
to settle the Air Force's affairs ourselves.(61)
Such then is my explanation of the facts and the results 
of my effort to perform the tasks given me by the President.
This included bringing the Army and Air Force together, which 
I did by summoning them and dispelling their fear-psychosis 
[lit.- angpsyhos!] towards the Army. Since I knew many Air Force 
officers personally, I summoned them one by one, and also in 
groups, so that eventually we were able to restore a [normal] 
atmosphere and eliminate mutual suspicion between the officers 
of the two forces. Then to paralyze [melumpuhkan] the armed 
strength [of the coup group] ... there were various units which 
had fled, but finally they too surrendered. In their flight 
they reached Bekasi, they reached Bekasi on October 1, and on 
October 2 they assembled and surrendered.(62)
Basically all the troops which had originally been involved, 
especially Battalions 45H and 530, were in our hands; whereupon 
it became clear that the men in these units had been swayed by
(60) The Indonesian: tTSjukur alhamdulillah bisa mengendalikan 
daripada anak2 kita jang liar balk untuk membalas dendam 
dllnja adalah tidak ada," is in many respects obscure.
The above- translation is a hopeful approximation to the 
General's meaning.
(61) The last word of the sentence, sendiri, is ambiguous. It 
may mean "ourselves” as in the translation above. It may 
may however refer to the Air Force; in which case the 
last phrase should be translated: "to settle the internal 
affairs of the Air Force."
(62) The Indonesian is very eccentric: "Untuk melumpuhkan
kekuatan jang bersendjata, ada beberapa pasukan jang 
tadinja melarikan d i n  akan tetapi djuga achirnja 
mereka menjerahkan d i n  waktu melarikan diri sampai 
Bekasi pada tg. 1 sampai Bekasi dan tg. 2nja mereTca 
mengumpulkan dan menjerahkan kembali.H BekasiT is a 
small town about twenty miles east of Djakarta.
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irresponsible elements. We also managed to capture the ring­
leaders of this affair, all, that is, except General Supardjo, 
who still has not been arrested. [This being so], it is now 
clearly the duty of the public and the mass organizations to 
help ensure General Supardjofs immediate apprehension. We still 
do not know the exact quantity of the arms that were distributed, 
although we have already confiscated several hundreds. But it 
is clear that there are still a great many in [unauthorized 
hands], and we shall have to keep up a constant effort to regain 
them as quickly as possible so that they do not remain in the 
hands of people outside the Armed Forces. This is my area of 
responsibility - restoring security. As for the political field, 
perhaps Pak Bandrio already gave an explanation yesterday. I 
am simply giving the facts to the Government, particularly to 
the President, to help settle matters in the political field, 
since the President has already decided: I appoint you to restore 
security and order; as for a political settlement, I shall settle 
that myself.
In this matter then my duty has been to restore order and
security, and I have done this as far as possible. Thanks be
to God, I have experienced [rasakan] the help of the progressive 
and revolutionary People, so that our efforts to regain distri­
buted arms and arrest the ringleaders of this affair, especially 
from the Army, have gone ahead very successfully.(63}
Such is the explanation that I felt I should give. I have
given you the facts, my brothers. It is up to you to make your
own evaluation with regard to the affair itself: Was it really
simply an internal Army affair, or was it politically-connected 
[apakah peristiwa itu hanja chusus peristiwa didalam AD ataukah 
penstiwa pang menjangkut dalam bidang politikT? For this, 
General SutjIpto will give you the facts which connect this 
affair with political q u e s t i o n s ^  I ask you to give General 
Sutjipto the time to give you further clarifications.
Thank you.
(63) The Indonesian is obscure: fl...dapat saja rasakan sehingga 
pengambilan sendjata tsb. maupurTpenangkapan terhadap 
pelaku2 daripada peristiwa baik daripada AD pada chususnja 
dapat berhasil dengan sebaik2nja.if
(64) Again the Indonesian is obscure and contorted: "Untuk itu 
maka Djenderal Sutjipto akan memberikan fakta2 jang
menjangkut peristiwa tsb. ja~ng berhubungan dengan soa!2 
politikT7^
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H• Speech of Caretaker Commander of the 72nd Military Resort 
(Jogjakarta - Surakarta), Colonel Widodo.
[The translation is based on the Indonesian language text in 
Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 8. Col. Widodo was appointed by 
General Surjosumpeno, Divisional Commander of the Vllth 
Military Territorial Command (Central Java), as temporary care­
taker Commander of the 72nd Military Resort in the place of 
Col. Katamso, who had been kidnapped and (as it later turned 
out) murdered by the September 30th Movement forces. Col. 
Widodo, whose appointment took effect on October 5, was thus 
the Army High Command1s agent for restoring control in the 
critical region around the old royal capitals of Surakarta 
and Jogjakarta. The following is his first major address 
issued to the public].
As you all know, since October 5, 1965, I, Colonel Widodo, 
Fourth Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Vllth Military 
Territorial Command (Diponegoro), on the orders of the Com­
mander of the Vllth Military Territorial Command (Diponegoro), 
Brigadier General Surjosumpeno, have assumed temporarv 
leadership of the 72nd Military Resort.
The basic tasks that I have been given by the Commander 
are: to restore the entire battle-order of the 72nd Military 
Resort to the fold of the Vllth Military Territorial Command 
(Diponegoro), and to locate and restore Colonel Katamso and 
Lieutenant Colonel Sugijono to their original posts - that is, 
to the posts they held prior to the so-called September 30th 
Movement.
I am thankful to say that the discharge of this task is 
proceeding very successfully thanks to the Soldiers, the 
N.C.O.'s and the Officers of the entire battle-order of the 
72nd Military Resort, who, genuinely inspired bv the spirit 
of the Sapta Marga and the Soldier's Oath, Pantiasila and 
Nasakom, honor everv order and line laid down by their Supreme 
Commander, Bung Karno, whom we all love and whom we all obey.
I am firmly convinced that my task will continue to have 
the support and understanding of all members of the T.N.I. 
within the hierarchy of the 72nd Military Resort, God willing 
[Insja Allah]. Amen.
In accordance with the wish of the Supreme Commander on 
the conditions for the unity of the Armed Forces and the People, 
as laid down in Manipol "....the Indonesian Armed Forces are 
not an Army separate from the People," -- and still more firmly 
in TAKARI1, "....Our Armed Services will become an invincible 
force if they are at one with the People,” —  I am fully con­
vinced that I shall receive sincere cooperation from the entire 
Mass of the People in this area, who have Nasakom as their 
axis and spirit.
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We all know that the present situation -- we feel that 
it is something which really and truly demands the attention 
of us all. We must realize that above all we must set aside 
our own individual interests and the interests of our group 
for the sake of the higher interests of the State, the People 
and the Revolution.
I therefore hope for the fullest understanding from the 
whole community —  that we must all take a firm attitude, 
side with the Indonesian Revolution, and remain unreservedly 
obedient to the high guidance and leadership of Bung Karno.
In carrying out the task of restoring the original 
[pre-October 1] situation, which I have received from the 
Commander of the Vllth Military Territorial Command (Dipone- 
goro), all of us who together are following the track of 
the Indonesian Revolution will certainly be able to march 
in step, since this task of restoring the situation is a 
prime condition, even an essential condition for carrying 
out the vital national task of the moment, i.e. implementing 
Dwikora.
In this connection I think I should stress that I have 
held extremely important talks with local notables [exponen2 
daerah], with the Consultative Regional Leadership Body of 
the Special Region of Jogjakarta -- and as we all know, this 
is a very broad forum.
In these very important talks, some very important 
conclusions were reached, [most particularly] that all groups 
within the Consultative Regional Leadership Body of the 
Special Region of Jogjakarta unanimously agreed to use all 
their influence to restore the situation.
I appeal therefore to all levels of the Community, to 
all the progressive and revolutionary People, who have 
Nasakom as their axis and their spirit, to obey all [their] 
leaders, and all instructions from existing leaders of the 
community, via the National Front, via the Political Parties 
and the Mass Organizations. Obey their instructions!
We must be on the alert, we must not doubt for a moment 
that Nekolim will take advantage of any internal problem 
among ourselves. Be sure that the path of Unity is the best 
path, since Unity, progressive revolutionary Unity, 
with Nasakom as its axis and spirit, is the teaching of the 
Great Leader of our Revolution.
As temporary Commander of the 72nd Military Resort, and 
also acting as PEPELRADA2 supervisor and coordinator in the 
areas of the Special Region of Jogjakarta and the former Resi­
dencies of Kedu and Surakarta, I appeal for the entire People's 
understanding on various matters, as follows:
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a) Avoid and refrain from any attitudes or actions which 
might give rise to divisions among ourselves.
b) Remain obedient to the President/Supreme Commander of 
the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno.
c) Assist the implementation of the restoration of the 
situation prior to the affair of the so-called September 30th 
Movement, because not assisting in this task is contrary to 
the lines laid down in the Messages of the President/Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution 
Bung Karno.
d) The whole community is strongly urged to obey the 
directives of the authorities with regard to meetings and 
other such matters, and also for the time being to refrain 
from organizing demonstrations and parades, as well as stick­
ing up placards, all of which can easily exacerbate the 
present critical situation.
e) Let us all heighten our devotion to the One God, and 
let us beseech the Supreme Essence, Allah the Almighty and 
All-Merciful, to bestow His Guidance and Blessing on us all.
Finally let us all together bow our heads for a moment 
in memory of the souls of those Heroes of the Indonesian 
Revolution, General (posthumous) Ahmad Yani, Lieutenant 
General (posthumous) Suprapto, Lieutenant General (posthumous) 
S. Parman, Lieutenant General (posthumous) Harjono, Major 
General (posthumous) Sutojo Siswomihardjo, Maior General 
(posthumous) Pandiaitan, and Captain (posthumous) Pier [sic] 
Tendean; may Allah, the Almighty and All-Merciful, forgive 
their shortcomings; may their souls be granted a place at 
God's side; and mav the families they have left behind find 
strength and firmness of faith, God willing. Amen.
NOTES
1. TAKARI is an acronvm for Tahun Berdikari (A Year of Stand­
ing on Our Own Feet), President Sukarno*s August 17th speech 
for 1965. 2
2. PEPELRADA is an abbreviation for Penguasa Pelaksanaan 
Dwikora Daerah (Regional Authority for the Implementation
of Dwikora, or as some sources less accurately have it, Regional 
Dwikora Administrator). The Pepelrada were set up bv Presi­
dential Decision No. 52/K0TI/1964 to help coordinate and 
direct Confrontation activities. Generally sneaking the local 
military were designated as the Pepelrada. The Presidential 
Decision gave the Peoelrada the power to act in a "quasi- 
martial law" fashion under "certain circumstances.
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5. Statement of General Nasution of November 12•
[This translation is based on the Indonesian text to be found 
in Berita Yudha of November 15. The statement was made at an 
informal meeting with a delegation of the Central Action Unit 
of Indonesian Students at Armed Forces Staff Headquarters.
The statement is one of the earliest public assessments of 
the October 1 Affair and its epilogue by the General.]
The General stated that we must not only completely 
destroy the executants of the "September 30th Movement11, but 
also its masterminds and their supporters.
He declared that the principal executants of the "Sep­
tember 30th Movement” had indeed turned out to be prominent 
veterans of the terror of the Madiun Affair. Since after 
[that affair] they had been permitted to operate, and had 
even been given opportunities to step up their activities, 
the results were what we can see todav.
Three times now thev have tried to kill me, the General 
averred. They savagely butchered our Generals and middle- 
level officers in the twinkling of an eve; civilian victims 
lie sprawled everywhere; they even tried to overthrow the 
state and the revolution. For this reason there must be 
no more hesitation against the executants, supporters and 
especially the masterminds of the "September 30th Movement."
They should not and can not be given any more opportunities, 
and their activities should no longer be protected by law.
They must be immediately smashed; especially their master­
minds and dangerous supporters must be isolated at once.
Since they have committed treason, and distorted the course 
of our state and revolution, they must be destroyed and 
quarantined from all activities in our fatherland. If they 
are still permitted to enjov freedom of movement, the safety 
of the state would certainly constantly be menaced.
After explaining that there had never been any so-called 
"Council of Generals", as bruited about in their cruel slanders 
concerning' the Armed Forces, General Nasution warned the 
students not to be deceived but to be constantly on the alert 
for the wicked slanders which recently have been so frequently 
hurled against us.
How easy to submit "documents" which they forged them­
selves, as slanderous evidence against the Armed Forces —  
which finally resulted in the national tragedy which has brought 
sorrow to us all.
Reacting to the question of the P.K.I., General Nasution 
stressed that it was not because we are anti-communist that 
we must annihilate the P.K.I. But proofs and undeniable facts, 
which have become widely known to the entire community,
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demonstrate that the P.K.I. has clearly betrayed the state 
and nation. They have clearly performed counter-revolutionary 
actions, they have clearly violated the basic [principles] 
of our state, and therefore we are obliged and dutybound 
to wipe them from the soil of Indonesia.
We must indeed be united. But must we, just because 
this group is Communist, although it has committed murder, 
torture, terror and treason against our state and government, 
still embrace it? This question, put by General Nasution to 
the student leaders, was immediately answered: "No!"
Finally General Nasution expressed his satisfaction 
that the students were now able to consolidate their unity, 
urged on by a sense of awareness and mutual responsibility 
towards the state and the revolution; and that they were 
united because they shared a common destiny and a common 
struggle in facing the dangers of "Gestapu" which is menacing 
student life.
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V. STATEMENTS BY THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
1. Editorial Appearing in the October 2 Edition of the Indonesian 
Communist Party Newspaper. Apparently Issued Late on the After­
noon of October 1.
tThe following translation is based exclusively on the Indonesian 
text found in Harian Rakjat of October 2. While the precise 
times at which this editorial was written and the paper actually 
printed and then issued can not be determined, it should be 
noted that both the normal Friday publishing practices of 
Harian Rakjat and the internal evidence of the issue indicate 
that the paper went to press in the late afternoon of October 1. 
This must have been shortly following receipt of news of the 
President's afternoon appointment of Major General Pranoto as 
caretaker of the Army —  for this news appears in Harian Rakjat 
as a "Stop Press" item.]
THE SEPTEMBER 30TH MOVEMENT
It has happened that on the 30th of September measures 
were taken to safeguard President Sukarno and the Republic of 
Indonesia from a coup by a so-called Council of Generals. 
According to what has been announced by the September 30th 
Movement, which is headed by Lt. Col. Untung of a Tjakrabirawa 
battalion, action taken to preserve President Sukarno and the 
Republic of Indonesia from the coup by the Council of Generals 
is patriotic and revolutionary.
Whatever the justification that may have been used by the 
Council of Generals in its attempt, the staging of a coup is a 
condemnable and counter-revolutionary act.
We the People fully comprehend what Lt. Col. Untung has 
asserted in carrying out his patriotic movement.
But however the case may be, this is an internal Army 
affair. On the other hand, we the People, who are conscious of 
the policy and duties of the revolution, are convinced of the 
correctness of the action taken by the September 30th Movement 
to preserve the revolution and the People.
The sympathy and support of the People is surely on the 
side of the September 30th Movement. We call on the People to 
intensify their vigilance and be prepared to confront all 
eventualities.
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2. Statement of the Leadership of the East Java Communist Youth 
Organization, Issued on October 1,
iThe translation of this statement of the East Java branch of 
the Pemuda Rakjat (.the Indonesian Communist Party’s Youth
Organization) is.based on the Indonesian text given in Berita
Yiidha, October 7, 1965,]
Leadership of the Major Region (East Java) People’s Youth,
Djl. Kaliasin 139, Surabaja,
Statement supporting the "September 30th Movement"
No. 156/V/PDB/65.
In connection with the occurrence of a September 30th Move­
ment under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Untung to 
safeguard the Indonesian Revolution and Bung Karno, and in 
relation to the Revolutionary situation which has enraged the 
counter-revolutionaries into forming a so-called "Council of 
Generals" to carry out a coup d’etat [against] the Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia, in the name of the 750,000 members 
of the People’s Youth for the whole of East Java, we declare 
our fullest support for, and stand behind the September 30th 
Movement in forming Indonesian Revolution Councils down to 
the regions.
We instruct all Organization Leadership Bodies as well as 
the entire membership of the East Java People’s Youth to 
sharpen their vigilance, heighten their support for Youth Unity 
on the basis of the Nasakom axis and carry out the Five Charms 
of the Revolution, in order to continue to crush American 
imperialism, "Malaysia," village devils, city devils, modern 
revisionism and other internal counter-revolutionary elements.
Surabaja, October 1, 1965.
Leadership of the Major Region
(East Java) People’s Youth,
signed,
Tjap S. Gijo.
(This statement has been sent to the Honorable Indonesian 
Revolution Council in Djakarta. Copies have been forwarded 
to the National Council of the People’s Youth in Djakarta, 
and to the Press and Radio).
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3. Statement of the North Sumatra Committee of the Indonesian 
Communist Party. Issued on October *4.
LThe translation is based on the Indonesian text of the Press 
Statement of Djalaludin Jusuf Nasution, First Secretary of 
the North Sumatra Major Regional Committee of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (P.K.I.) on October 4, 1965, as contained in 
the Medan daily, Harian Harapan,for October 5, 1965.]
I would like to say first of all that it would be inappro­
priate to issue a hasty opinion in assessing an event as serious 
as the September 30th Affair, especially for us here, in an area 
so diistant from the scene of that Affair. The important thing 
is to take an attitude of sincerely joining in helping to settle 
the Affair by ensuring the victory of the demands of the Revolu­
tion in accordance with Bung Karnofs line in Manipol.
As we know from RRI broadcasts, since Lieutenant Colonel 
Untung!s announcement of a September 30th Movement, claiming to 
aim, among other things, at safeguarding President Sukarno and 
the Republic of Indonesia from the danger of a coup by a Council 
of Generals, and carrying out a purge within the body of the Army, 
a series of events have transpired in a short time, the most 
important of which have been:
1. On October 1, 1965, the President/Supreme Commander of 
the Armed Forces/ Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno 
issued an order as stated in his first Message of October 2.
2. Also on October 1, Major General Suharto took over 
temporary leadership of the Army to overcome the September 
30th Movement.
3. On October 2, the President/Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces/ Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno in 
his first Message declared that leadership of the Army was 
directly in his hands.
4. On October 3, the President/Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces/ Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno issued 
his second Message, saying, among other things, that accusations 
that the Indonesian Air Force was involved in the September 30th 
Affair were not true.
From this chain of events, and in accordance with Bung Karno!s 
own affirmations in his Messages, namely that Bung Karno continued 
to hold the top leadership of the Indonesian State, Government 
and Revolution,
It is therefore my opinion that for every revolutionary 
person who truly loves the Republic of Indonesia and the Great 
Leader of the Revolution, Bung Karno, the only guides [pegangan] 
for helping to settle the September 30th Affair are the Messages
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and the policy of the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces/ Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno.
Giving interpretations conflicting with the lines laid down 
by Bung Karno, let alone interpretations which are insinuating 
and provocative, will not only give rise to new difficulties 
but m$y also mean opposing the policy of the Great Leader of 
the Revolution Bung Karno.
I call on all cadres, candidate-members and members of the 
P.K.I., as well as all the progressive masses in this area, 
constantly to heighten their vigilance and also constantly 
to advance the revolutionary offensive in all fields and above 
all to make a success of Dwikora.
4. Statement of the Jogjakarta Regional Committee of the 
Indonesian Communist Party. Issued on October 5.
[The translation is basedon the Javanese text found in the 
Jogjakarta daily, Ariwarti Waspada, of October 6, 1965. The 
October 1st "Instruction** of the Central Java PKI referred to 
in the text did not appear in earlier editions of Ariwarti 
Waspada.3
The September 30, 1965, Affair clearly must be regarded with 
great seriousness by all levels of the community so that the 
policy of His Excellency, President/Great Leader of the Revolu­
tion/Bung Karno for settling this Affair can go forward smoothly 
and as successfully as possible in order to ensure the victory 
of our national revolution.
The Jogjakarta Regional Committee of the P.K.I. is firmly 
of the opinion, as [expressed in] the Instruction of the Central 
Java Committee of the P.K.I., dated October 1, 1965, that the 
September 30th, 1965, Affair is an internal Army problem, and 
therefore that the Party has no part in it.
At present His Excellency the President has already announced 
his policy. It is now the duty of the revolutionary forces to 
help settle [things] as successfully as possible.
But it is extremely regrettable that after the ceremony 
formalizing the take-over of the former "Jefferson" Building 
by the National Front of the Special Region of Jogjakarta on 
October 4, 1965, at about 17:00 hours, a gang of H.M.I. people 
carried out anarchic actions reminiscent of the practices of 
the D.I./T.I.I., tearing down the signboard of the Jogjakarta 
Regional Committee of the P.K.I., breaking glass panes in the 
door, burning posters for the C.G.M.I. Congress, uprooting the 
signboards of the People's Youth, Resort Committees and Gerwani, 
throwing stones at the Pembaruan book-store and uttering threaten­
ing yells.
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These actions,which must be condemned, clearly obstruct 
the smooth working of the policy of His Excellency President 
Sukarno! In connection with this, the Jogjakarta Regional 
Committee of the P.K.I. declares:
1. Once again, all members and candidate members of the 
P.K.I. (Jogjakarta Region) are urged to hold firmly to the 
October 1, 1965, Instruction of the Major Region Committee.
2. [The Committee] strongly condemns the H.M.I. gang 
which is disturbing the policy of His Excellency the President, 
which must be helped by [maintaining] calmness.
3. [The Committee] calls on all revolutionary forces which 
have Nasakom as their axis and spirit to close their ranks 
still more firmly and help His Excellency President Sukarno
in settling this very serious problem to ensure the victory 
of our national revolution.
Long Live Bung Karno!
Long Live Revolutionary Unity!
Long Live the Republic of Indonesia!
5. Statement of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the Indonesian Communist Party] Issued on October 5J 
[The translation is based on theidentical Indonesian and 
Javanese texts of this statement appearing in the Jogjakarta 
daily, Ariwarti Waspada,for October 8 and 9.]
The Indonesian Communist Party Supports the Message of 
President Sukarno, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of 
the Republic of Indonesia, on settling the problem of the 
September 30th Movement.
Having carefully studied the Message of President Sukarno, 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia and Great Leader of the Revolution, the Political 
Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist 
Party states that it fully supports this Message, and calls on 
all Committees of the P.K.I., all members and sympathizers of 
the P.K.I. and all revolutionary mass organizations led by P.K.I. 
cadres to help carry out the Message of President Sukarno,
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia and Great Leader of the Revolution.
With regard to the September 30th Movement, the Central 
Committee of the P.K.I. considers it to be an internal problem 
of the Army and the P.K.I. does not involve itself in it 
[tidak mentjampurinja].
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With regard to the names of members of the P.K.I. included 
in the list of the Indonesian Revolution Council, it can be 
stated, as a consequence of questions put to the members con­
cerned, that these members were neither informed beforehand 
nor asked for their permission.
The Central Committee of the P.K.I. calls on the whole 
People to continue to heighten their vigilance, to continue to 
strengthen the National United Front, the Nasakom Axis and the 
Nasakom Spirit in putting into practice the Five Charms of 
the Revolution, in carrying out Dwikora to crush the joint 
British-U.S. Project "Malaysia," and to continue the anti-Nekolim 
struggle in general.
Djakarta, October 5, 1965.
Political Bureau, Central Committee 
of the P.K.I.
6. Appeal of the Central Java Committee of the Indonesian *9
Communist Rarty. Issued on October 7 or 8.
LThe translation is derived from the Indonesian text presented 
in the Semarang daily, Gema Massa,for October 9, 1965. Although 
no date is given for the statement, the fact that the Cabinet 
meeting referred to in the text took place on October 6 and 
the fact that the paper carrying the statement is dated October
9 makes it probable that the statement was issued on October 7 
or October 8. The headlines of the news item carrying the 
statement are given at the outset.]
Appeal of the Central Java PKI Committee
Faithfully Implement and Secure President 
Sukarno's Line for Settling the Problem 
of the "September 30th Movement"
In order to carry out the Statement of the Political Bureau 
of the Central Committee of the P.K.I. with regard to settling 
the problem of the "September 30th Movement" in accordance with
the Message of His Excellency the President and the clarification
[given by] His Excellency the President in the plenary session of 
the Dwikora Cabinet just held in the Bogor Palace, all cadres, 
members and sympathizers of the P.K.I. throughout Central Java 
are instructed:
1. To help create a calm and orderly atmosphere in the regions 
as a condition for smoothing the way to a political solution to 
the problem of the "September> 30th Movement" as set forth in the
Message of His Excellency the President/Supreme Commander of the
Indonesian Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno.
190
2. To implement faithfully the directive of His Excellency 
the President in the plenary session of the Dwikora Cabinet, 
that we not lose our heads, that we not be ruled by passions 
[or] by accusations and counter-accusations which serve to sow 
discord among us, because this is precisely what Nekolim desire 
and are waiting for.
3. To safeguard and continuously to strengthen National 
Revolutionary Unity based on the Nasakom axis and spirit, to 
avoid physical clashes which might arise among fellow revolu­
tionary forces in the regions, to reintensify the implementation 
of the Pantja Azimat Revolusi [the five charms of the revolu­
tion] and to ensure the victory of Dwikora by crushing the 
neo-colonialist project "Malaysia."
Long Live Nasakom!
Long Live Manipol!
Ever Onward, Never Retreat!
Such is the appeal of the Central Java Committee of the 
P.K.I.
7. Policy Guideline Issued by the Acting Governor of Central Java 
in mid-October.
iThe text is based on a Javanese language original contained 
in Ariwarti Waspada (Jogjakarta) of October 16. It should be 
noted that Acting Governor Sujono Atmo was,if not officially a 
PKI member, certainly very close to the Party indeed.]
The Acting Governor of Central Java, Sujono Atmo, recently 
issued a policy guideline of the Provincial Government to [all] 
Bupatis/Mayors/Regional Heads and Department Chiefs as well as 
assistants/liaison officials of the Governor within the ter­
ritory of Central Java, the contents of which are as follows:
1. The guidelines or pillars of the policy of the Provincial 
Government are:
a. The Message of His Excellency the President of October
2, 1965;
b. The Message of His Excellency the President of October
3, 1965;
c. The briefing given by His Excellency the President in 
the presence of the commanders of Greater Djakarta 
combat units;
d. The Instruction of His Honor the Minister of the 
Interior issued over the radio, and the appeal of the 
Central Java Pantjatunggal of October 2, 1965;
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e. The decisions of the plenary session of the Dwikora 
Cabinet in the Bogor Palace on October 6, 1965, the 
essence of which:
1. Condemned the murderous acts committed against 
6 Senior Officers and [1] Junior Officer of the 
Army, who have now been declared Heroes of the 
Revolution by the President/Supreme Commander of 
the Armed Forces and the whole Indonesian People.
2. Disapproved the actions of the Revolution 
Council.
3. [Declared] the need for a calm and disciplined 
atmosphere to settle the September 30th Affair.
II. It is therefore hereby instructed:
1. That Bupatis/Mayors/Regional Heads and Department 
Chiefs harmonize their attitudes and perform their 
duties in accordance with the essence of the above- 
mentioned Messages and Decisions.
2. That day-to-day duties be carried on as usual and 
that Bupatis/Mayors/Regional Heads and Department 
Chiefs preserve discipline and calm in connection 
with their work and also do their utmost to try to 
heighten vigilance with regard to Nekolim provoca­
tions .
3. That they hold frequent consultations and delibera­
tions with the National Front in carrying out the 
Messages of the President/Supreme Leader of the 
National Front.
4. That they assist the efforts undertaken by the 
Armed Forces of Central Java to restore security 
and order.
5. Since the Revolution Council is not correct, that 
Bupatis/Mayors and Regional Heads throughout 
Central Java see that such elements are dissolved 
where they exist.
6. That they closely coordinate their activities to­
gether with the Pantja Tunggal, each in their own 
areas.
7. That they make sure that the wheels of the economy 
turn as usual and make every effort to lighten the 
burdens of the People.
Thus the appeal/instruction of the Acting Governor of 
Central Java, Sujono Atmo.
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8. Interview of Second Deputy Chairman of the P.K.I. Njoto 
with Asahi Shimbun, December 2.
[Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NtHWS in English December 2,1965—  Verbatim 
transcript of the written question and answer exchange between 
ASAHI SHIMBUN Djakarta correspondents, Risuke Hayashi and 
Takehiko Tadokoro,and Second Deputy Chairman Njoto of the 
Indonesian Communist Party.]
[Text] Question: Do you think the 30 September Movement is a 
counterrevolution to the Indonesian revolution, as the army 
charges?
Njoto: If we talk about revolution and counterrevolution, there
must first be an answer to the question: Revolution by whom and
against whom? In Indonesia, one may say, people all agree that 
the issue is: Was Untung's premise about there being a "council
of generals" that wanted to carry out a coup d'etat true? If 
there is not a "council of generals" then Untung was wrong, or 
it may be said, counterrevolutionary. If there is a "council 
of generals" then Untung was not wrong, or it may be said, 
revolutionary.
Question: How about the foreign influence on the movement?
Njoto: I don't know anything about foreign influence on the
30 September Movement. As you gentlemen know, the PKI believes 
that it is an internal matter of the army. If you ask was 
there any foreign influence on the 30 September Movement it 
means the same thing as asking, is there any foreign influence 
in the army?
Question: What do you think about the activities of Nekolim,
especially the activities of the American CIA before this 
movement? How about the connections between this movement 
and CIA?
Njoto: Nekolim activities, in particular the CIA of the United
States, were there not only before, but also during and after 
the 30 September affair. It is not very easy to see CIA 
activities because, first of all, CIA works in a subversive way; 
and second, because in Indonesia nowadays all persons state they 
are anti-CIA. CIA agents themselves shout they are anti-CIA. 
Certainly, CIA is not like the "good fairy" in children's stories 
with the result that, while things are happening in Indonesia as 
today, they only sit doing nothing, idly looking on. It is 
certain there are connections between CIA and the prolog and 
epilog of 30 September. I cannot yet say whether CIA stood on 
that side or this side.
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Question: What do you think about the reports or announcements
which relate the communist party with this movement and the 
murders of seven generals?
Njoto: Concerning the connections between the PKI and the
30 September Movement and the murders of seven generals, the 
PKI leadership, as was the case with most others, knew nothing 
of either of these until after they happened. At that time,
I, together with First Deputy Premier Dr. Subandrio and a number 
of army, navy, air force, and police generals, was on a journey 
in Sumatra for the state. We heard about the 30 September 
affair together when we were in Pangkalan Brandan, North Sumatra, 
and we were all shocked in the same way.
Question: What do you think of President Sukarno’s announcement
that the 30 September Movement was not just within the army, 
but also a problem of the nation?
Njoto: President Sukarno on one side said that "there have taken
place events in the army and in the Tjakrabirawa Regiment 
(Presidential Guard Regiment), and on the other side he said it 
is a "national question." The PKI feels the same. If it is 
said that it is an internal matter of the army, this is not 
meant to say that it is not a national question. Or that it 
cannot become a national question. The PKI has never believed 
that. Neither President Sukarno’s opinion nor the PKI’s opinion 
which is the same is a contradiction in terminis.
Question: What do you think about the arming of your party which
many people saw? Especially, how about the Pemuda Rakjat?
Njoto: Indonesians now getting military training, inclusive of
the use of several kinds of conventional weapons, are not 
restricted to communists and members of the Pemuda Rakjat; the 
four forces— army, navy, air force, and police force— are all 
training masses of citizens and youths. As you know in Indonesia 
now, in facing "Malaysia," about 22 million volunteers have been 
organized and, if I am not wrong, it is President Sukarno’s plan 
that all of them must have military training.
Question: Do you still support President Sukarno and his Nasakom
regime?
Njoto: This question should better be asked of the ones who,
since 1 October, have ignored President Sukarno’s commands. In 
the statement of its Poiitburo both on 5 and 10 October and 
also in actual deeds, the PKI fully backs the President’s commands 
I do not understand very well what you mean by "Nasakom regime," 
formerly, now, or in the future. If you mean the first two, the 
"former one" or the "present one," not one of them has ever existed 
President Sukarno says that a Nasakom government continues to 
be his aspiration.
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Question: What do you think about the activities of the army
or the religious parties urging that the communist party should 
be outlawed or prohibited?
Njoto: I don’t think that the whole army and every religious
party is urging the dissolution of the PKI. This is not an
"effort t o .............. 1 * because I am only— to borrow an
expression used by Gen. Ibrahim Adjie— stating facts. If the 
whole army was already anti-PKI, then there would not be a 
necessity for "Koti Instruction No. 22" on the "cleaning-up."
As you know, for almost two months, the left side of the front­
page up to the right side of the backpage has demanded the 
dissolution of the PKI. But President Sukarno has not dissolved 
the PKI. He has even retained the Nasakom theory. This is 
indeed the objective basis of the Indonesian revolution. As 
President Sukarno said: "It will not be an Indonesian revolution
if there is no Nasakom."
Question: What do you think of the suppression or arrests of
communists by the army?
Njoto: In Japan and also in South Korea, in Australia as well
as Indonesia, suppressions and arrests of communists are always 
part of an antidemocracy policy. Concerning Japan, what I mean 
is not the anti-Comintern pact of former times, but during the 
time of MacArthur during the 1950’s. Regarding Indonesia, this 
is not just the first time the PKI has become the target of mass 
oppression and arrests. We experienced them during the Dutch 
colonial time in 1926, then in 1936, and we experienced them yet 
again under Hatta’s government, in 19^8, and under Sukiman’s 
Masjumi government in 1951. Each time, we rose again, and 
became bigger than before because, as Bung Karno said, a 
revolutionary movement is an objective thing which cannot be 
"made" by the revolutionaries, just as it cannot be curbed by 
the counterrevolutionaries; it will advance if not suppressed, 
but it will also advance even if suppressed.
Question: How about the anticommunist or anti-Chinese demonstra­
tions of the rightwing who sometimes carried out burnings? Do 
you think some parts of the religious parties are rightwing?
Njoto: Both anticommunism and anti-Chinese demonstrations are
directly opposed to the republic’s state policy as stated in the 
Manipol. Regarding burnings of offices, houses, shops and so 
on--which are always done by the rightwing and never by the 
leftwing— President Sukarno announced that the ones doing such 
things can be shot. In the religious parties, there are right­
wingers and groups that represent the policy or are related with 
former members of Masjumi or formerly of the DI-TII. But the 
mass members of those parties are ordinary peasants and workers, 
and the interests of these are the same as the interests of the 
mass members of the nonreligious parties.
* One or two words are obscured in the text.
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Question: What do you think about disregard by the army, religious
parties, or rightwing organizations of such presidential orders 
as the prohibition of demonstrations?
Njoto: Indeed, truly, the President’s commands— not only his
commands concerning the ban of demonstrations— are being upset 
by the rightwing, civilian as well as military. But the majority 
of the masses support President Sukarno's commands. These 
actions to upset the President's commands are the reason why a 
"committee for safeguarding the President's messages" has been 
set up, organized by the PPMI— the Federation of the Students'
Hass Organizations of Indonesia.
Question: Who are the real powers in Indonesia?
Njoto: The Indonesian Constitution spells out that President
Sukarno in addition to being head of state is also supreme 
commander of the ABRI and prime minister, too. The powers of 
President Sukarno, in combination with the forces of the people, 
shall determine Indonesia's fate and future.
Question: What do you think about the reshuffle of the Sukarno
cabinet in the near future which the parties are now urging?
Njoto: Sooner or later, a Nasakom cabinet will be established
in Indonesia. This is the wish of President Sukarno; it is the 
wish of the people. If President Sukarno takes this way, not 
only the PKI but the whole people will welcome it with joy.
Question: How about your party's course in the countryside in
the future? How does your party set up liberated areas in the 
countryside?
Njoto: The line of the PKI in the villages is the same: support
implementation of the UUPA (land reform law) and UUPBH (law 
concerning the dividing of crops), up till the time that the 
principle of "land for the tiliers of the land" and the principle 
of "peasants who work the land get land" can be implemented. The 
PKI's program is to divide the land as the individual property 
of each peasant, which means that a bigger family gets more. In 
Indonesia there is only one kind of power, the power of the 
Republic of Indonesia, and there is not any sort of "liberated 
areas."
Question: How can your party set up your own army? Lenin and
Mao Tse-tung have maintained that the establishment of the army 
of the communist party is an indispensable condition of revolution.
Njoto: The PKI always regards the Indonesian army as being not
the same as armies in the imperialist countries or as in India 
now, seen both from the history of its formation as well as from 
the tasks of being against imperialism and feudalism, and also
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seen from the composition of its soldiers which mostly come from 
the peasant and worker classes. That there still exist in the 
national army antipeople elements is the same thing as in the 
republic as a whole. This is the reason for the Manipol to talk 
about retooling the right elements from the state bodies. But 
there are times when people forget this line of the Manipol and 
carry out retooling of the leftwing.
Question: How about the relations between your own army and the
present professional army?
Njoto: The PKI has never had its own army. This is why there
is no connection in any way between this thing that never existed 
and the national army.
Question: What do you think about the tone of Soviet arguments
which regard the 30 September Movement as a rebel movement or 
regard General Nasution as the representative of your country 
along with President Sukarno?
Njoto: I only read the long article in PRAVDA on 26 November
which as well as other things told of the great role played by 
the PKI in the national independence movement and of it being 
not right to oppress this party, unless you want to oppress 
the whole revolutionary movement. The tone of the article was 
defending the PKI's right to live and this is why I think it 
is good. The PKI only knows one head of state, supreme commander, 
great leader of the revolution, namely, President Sukarno, and 
knows no other.
Question: What do you think about the foreign reports or informa­
tion about the new communist party whose policy will be peaceful 
coexistence such as in the Soviet Communist Party?
Njoto: It is not possible in Indonesia to establish another
communist party except the PKI, unless persons want to force 
and bring about the forming of a party of crypto-communism or 
pseudo-communism. About "peaceful coexistence," this is not the 
foreign policy line of the republic. Not only the communists 
oppose this line, but also every Manipolist in Indonesia. The 
correct PKI and republic's foreign policy line is aimed at 
building a new world where no imperialism exists. Consequently 
the foreign policy is anti-Nekolim, and making confrontation of 
the Nefo against Oldefo, for building a new world without imperialism.
Question: How does your party plan to avoid a civil war?
Njoto: It is true that the PKI is trying as much as possible to
prevent a civil war in Indonesia. Although some are trying to 
misinterpret the 5 October statement of the Politburo of the 
Central Committee of the PKI, five days after the 30 September 
affair, it is nevertheless undeniable that the attitude of that
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statement is a serious attempt to prevent civil war. If murders 
in fact and other acts of violence happen, this is not the 
responsibility of the PKI, they are fully the responsibility 
of the ones who go against the commands of President Sukarno.
But if the PKI continues to be acted against injustly then, of 
course, it will have the right to defend itself.
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VI. STATEMENTS BY THE INDONESIAN NATIONALIST PARTY
1. General Statement by the Central Leadership Council of the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party. Issued on October l !
Ltwo versions exist of the statement issued on October 1, 1965, 
by the Central Leadership Council of the Indonesian Nationalist 
Party (D.P.P.-P.N.I.). The first can be found in the Antara 
news bulletin of the morning of October 2; the second appears 
in the Medan P.N.I. newspaper Patriot, on October 6. Since 
both the wording and the timing of the two versions differ 
significantly (Version 1 is supposed to have been issued on the 
evening of October 1 - i.e. after the Army counter-coup; Version 
2 is reported to have been issued on the afternoon of October 1, 
when the September 30th Movement still maintained control of 
central Djakarta), a certain controversy has arisen over the 
real attitude of the P.N.I. during the critical hours of 
October 1. For details of this controversy, the reader is 
referred to A p i , October 10-14, and Marhaen (Makassar), October 
13, and Nasional (Jogjakarta), November 5. To allow the reader 
to reach his own conclusions about this point, we have included 
the Indonesian texts of both versions, also giving an English 
translation of the Antara version which the P.N.I. seems to 
prefer at the moment"! TFis translation is based on the 
Indonesian text appearing in Antara, October 2 (Morning Edition).]
A session of the Central Leadership Council of the P.N.I., 
enlarged to include the leadership of the Marhaenist Mass Move­
ment, after studying the latest developments in the capital, 
has taken the following decisions:
1. To remain firm and loyal to the Great Leader of the 
Revolution/Father of Marhaenism Bung Karno and be ready to 
carry out every command issued by the Great Leader of the 
Revolution/Father of Marhaenism Bung Karno to safeguard the 
revolution.
2. To acknowledge only Bung Karno*s leadership of the revolu­
tion and those bodies recognized as faithful, loyal and obedient 
to the command of Bung Karno as the voice of the Marhaenist 
masses.
3. To express deep appreciation to soldiers [para pradjurit] 
who have shown their loyalty in safeguarding the Great Leader
of the Revolution/Father of Marhaenism Bung Karno.
4. In this connection the entire membership of the P.N.I./ 
Marhaenist Front, within the structure of regional councils, 
district and branch groups,together with all members of the 
Marhaenist Mass Movement, declare themselves in a state of pre­
paredness to take revolutionary actions together with other 
progressive revolutionary forces, under the leadership of Bung 
Karno, to safeguard the course of the revolution.
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5. To support every action taken to purge the apparatus of 
the revolution of bogus elements and those who would undermine 
the authority of the Great Leader of the Revolution/Father of 
Marhaenism Bung Karno.
6. To instruct all members of the P.N.I./Marhaenist Front 
to be vigilant towards the provocations of the henchmen of 
Nekolim and counter-revolutionary elements.
Such is the announcement of the D.P.P.-P.N.I., issued Friday 
night [Djum'at malam] by the Department of Information and 
Propaganda of the D . P .P .- P .N .I .
D.P.P. - P.N.I. TENTANG PERKEHBANGAN TERACHIR PI IBUKOTA
[This is the version contained in Antara (Warta Berita) 
for the morning of October 2, 1965.J
Sidang D.P.P. - P.N.I. jang diperluas dengan pimpinan 
Gerakan Massa Marhaenis, setelah mempeladjari perkembangan 
terachir diibukota telah mengambil keputusan sbb:
1. Tetap teguh dan setia kepada Pemimpin Besar Revolusi/ 
Bapak Marhaenisme Bung Karno dan siap sedia mendjalankan setiap 
komando jang dikeluarkan oleh Pemimpin Besar Revolusi/Bapak 
Marhaenisme Bung Karno dalam menjelamatkan revolusi.
2. Hanja mengakui kepemimpinan revolusi Bung Karno dan 
badan2 jang disetudjui, setia, taat dan mematuhi komando Bung 
Karno sebagai penjambung lidah Massa Marhaen.
3. Menjatakan penghargaan jang tinggi kepada para Pradjurit 
jang telah menundjukkan kesetiaannja untuk menjelamatkan Pemimpin 
Besar Revolusi/Bapak Marhaenisme Bung Karno.
4. Dalam hubungan ini segenap anggota P.N.I./F.M. dalam 
formasi dewan daerah, tjabang sampai keranting2, beserta segenap 
anggota gerakan massa Marhaen, menjatakan dalam keadaan siapsiaga 
untuk ber-sama2 kekuatan progresif revolusioner lainnja melakukan 
aksi2 revolusioner dibawah pimpinan Bung Karno untuk mengamankan 
djalannja revolusi.
5. Mendukung setiap tindakan jang dilakukan untuk 
membersihkan aparatur revolusi dari kaum gadungap dan perongrong 
kewibawaan Pemimpin Besar Revolusi/Bapak Marhaenisme Bung Karno.
6. Menginstruksikan kepada segenap anggota P.N.I./F.M. 
untuk waspada terhadap provokasi2 kakitangan Nekolim dan kaum 
kontra-revolusioner.
Demikian pengumuman D.P.P. - P.N.I. jang dikeluarkan 
Djum'at malam oleh Departemen Penerangan/Propaganda D.P.P. - 
P.N.I.
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D.P.P. - P.N.I. TENTANG PERKEMBANGAN TERACHIR PI IBUKOTA
[This is the version contained in the Medan P.N.I. news­
paper Patriot, on October 6.]
Pernjataan jang diumumkan di Djakarta pada tanggal 1 
October, 1965, sore, oleh Dep. Penprop D.P.P. - P.N.I. itu 
selengkapnja adalah sbb:
Sidang D.P.P. - P.N.I. jang diperluas dengan pimpinan 
Gerakan Massa Marhaen jang berlangsung di Djakarta hari Djum'at, 
tanggal 1 October, 1965, setelah mempeladjari perkembangan 
terachir diibukota telah mengambil keputusan sbb:
1. Tetap teguh dan setia kepada Pemimpin Besar Revolusi/ 
Bapak Marhaenisme Bung Karno dan siap sedia melaksanakan setiap 
komando jang dikeluarkan oleh Pemimpin Besar Revolusi/Bapak 
Marhaenisme Bung Karno untuk menjelamatkan revolusi.
2. Hanja mengakui kepemimpinan revolusi Bung Karno dan 
badan2 jang direstui, setia, taat dan mematuhi komando Bung 
Karno penjambung lidah massa Marhaen.
3. Menjatakan penghargaan jang tinggi kepada Pradjurit 
jang telah menundjukkan kesetiaannja untuk menjelamatkan 
Pemimpin Besar Revolusi.
4. Dalam rangka menghadapi segala kemungkinan, maka segenap 
anggota P.N.I./F.M. dalam formasi Dewan Daerah, Dewan Tjabang 
sampai keranting2 beserta segenap anggota Gerakan Massa Marhaen 
dinjatakan dalam keadaan siapsiaga untuk ber-sama2 kekuatan 
progresif revolusioner lainnja melaksanakan aksi2 revolusioner 
dibawah pimpinan Bung Karno untuk mengamankan djalannja 
revolusi.
5. Mendukung setiap gerakan atau tindakan jang dilakukan 
untuk membersihkan aparatur revolusi dari kaum gadungan dan 
perongrongan kewibawaan Pemimpin Besar Revolusi.
6. Menginstruksikan kepada segenap anggota P.N.I./F.M. 
untuk tetap mempertinggi kewaspadaan menghadapi provokasi2 
kakitangan Nekolim dan kaum kontra revolusi.
Demikian pernjataan D.P.P. - P.N.I. jang dikeluarkan pada
tanggal 1 October, 1965. (Sulindo).
2. Statement of the Central Leadership Council of the Marhaenist 
Mass Movement" Presumably issued on October 1 .
[The translation is based on the Indonesian text contained in the 
Medan P.N.I. newspaper Patriot, of October 6, 1965. The document 
is included because according to an official P.N.I. statement of 
October 15, the Gerakan Massa Marhaen was never authorized to
201
put out any statements whatever about the events of October 1. 
In that this statement appeared alongside the above cited 
D.P.P. - P.N.I. statement of October 1, it is assumed that this 
statement, also from Djakarta, was probably issued on October 1.]
The Central Leadership Council of the Marhaenist Mass Move­
ment, which consists of: the Union of Marhaenist Labor, Petani,
Marhaenist Youth, the Indonesian Nationalist Highschool Students' 
Movement, the Indonesian Nationalist University Students' Move­
ment, the Marhaenist Women's Movement, the National Cultural 
Institute, the Djamiatul Muslimin, the League of Indonesian 
Peoples' Scholars, and the Marhaenist Fishermen's Movement,
Hereby instructs all members throughout Indonesia to carry 
out the instructions of the D.P.P. - P.N.I./Marhaenist Front, 
dated October 1, 1965, with all its consequences.
The Indonesian Revolution under the leadership of His 
Excellency the President/Great Leader of the Revolution/Father 
of Marhaenism Bung Karno demands the highest sacrifices from 
the whole Marhaenist Mass Movement in order to safeguard the 
Indonesian revolution.
1. Central Leadership Council 
of the Union of Marhaenist 
Labor signed Bachtiar Salim H.
2. Central Leadership Council 
of Petani signed Notosukardjo
3. Central Leadership Council 
of Marhaenist Youth signed Zaini Mansjur
4. Central Leadership Council 
of the Indonesian Nationalist 
Highschool Students' Move­
ment signed Rudy H. Sihombing
5. Central Leadership Council 
of the Indonesian National­
ist University Students' 
Movement signed B . Kusnohadi
6. Central Leadership Council 
of the Marhaenist Women's 
Movement signed M r s . Sumari
7. Central Leadership Council 
of the National Cultural 
Institute signed Sitor Situmorang
8. Central Leadership Council 
of the Djamiatul Muslimin signed H. Moh. Djambek
9. Central Leadership Council 
of the League of Indonesian 
Peoples' Scholars signed Drs. Soekarno
10. Central Leadership Council 
of the Marhaenist Fisher­
men's Movement signed S. Sawarno S.H.
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3. Press Statement of the Central Leadership Council of the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party on the Inclusion of Some of Its 
Members in the Indonesian Revolution Council. Issued on the 
late evening of October I .
Llhe translation is taken from the Indonesian text in the 
Suluh Indonesia of October 2, as it appears in a photostat 
printed in BerTta Yudha of October Another version of 
the same statement, appearing in Marhaen (Makassar) on 
October 4 and Patriot (Medan) also on October 4, is appended 
below.]
(a) The PNI Central Leadership Council Knows Nothing
In connection with the inclusion of the names of members 
of the P.N.I./Marhaenist Front in the list of members of the 
"Revolution Council," the D.P.P.- P.N.I. in a press statement 
last night asserted that the D.P.P.- P.N.I. knows nothing about 
and bears no responsibility for the inclusion of those names.
In addition, the members of the P.N.I. whose names were 
used by the "Revolution Council," namely Surachman, Zaini 
Mansjur, Bambang Kusnohadi, Supeni, Sumarno S.H. and A. Karim 
D.P., declare that they know nothing about and bear no responsi­
bility for the use of their names.
Thus the press statement issued by the D.P.P.-P.N.I. last 
night.
(b) The D.P.P.-P.N.I. knows nothing of and bears no responsi­
bility for the inclusion of the names of members of the leader­
ship of the P.N.I./Marhaenist Front in the list of members of 
the so-called Indonesian Revolution Council.
All members of the P.N.I./Marhaenist Front are urged to 
continue to heighten their vigilance and not to be easily 
ensnared by evil intrigues and intimidation on the part of the 
counter-revolutionaries, and only to heed and obey instructions 
from the D.P.P.-P.N.I./Marhaenist Front.
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VII. STATEMENT OF THE N.U., P.S.I.I., 
I.P.K.I. AND CATHOLIC PARTY
1. Statement of October H by the Action Unit for Crushing 
the Counter-Revolutionary September 30th Movement. "
LThis statement of the Kesatuan Xksi MengganjangGerakan 
Kontra Revolusi 30 September, representing affiliates of the 
NU, IPKI, Catholic Party, and PSII, and other organizations 
belonging to the Joint Secretariat of the National Front, 
was read at a demonstration in Djakarta on October 4, 1965, 
by NU Vice Chairman Subhan, and presented to the KOSTRAD 
(Army Strategic Command) with an appeal for action. The 
translation is based on the Indonesian text to be found in 
Berita Yudha of October 5. The statement is the first public 
anti-Ciommunist reaction to the events of October 1.]
The Action Unit for the Crushing of the "Counter-Revo­
lutionary September 30 Movement", after having studied the 
counter-revolutionary adventure of the so-called "September 
30 Movement", which has carried out counter-revolutionary 
actions to overthrow the legitimate government under the 
leadership of H.E. President/Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno, hereby 
declares with firm unanimity the following:
I. That we continue to stand completely and unreservedly 
behind H.E. the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces/ Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno and are 
prepared to assist the Government, including the Great Leader 
of the Revolution Bung Karno, in destroying the "Counter­
revolutionary September 30th Movement" down to its roots.
II. That we support and are ready to carry out the policy 
of H.E. the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/ 
Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno in destroying the 
"Counter-revolutionary September 30th Movement."
III. We condemn as harshly as possible the terrorist 
activities of the counter-revolutionary "September 30th Move­
ment" gang, which has terrorized, kidnapped and brutallv 
murdered several senior officers of the Army.
IV. We extend our deepest condolences and sympathy for 
the death of several senior officers of the Army, and pray 
that the several [other] senior officers whose fate is still 
unknown may actually be safe and well.
V. We urged H.E, the President/Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno to:
A. Ban and dissolve those parties and mass organiza­
tions which masterminded, supported, assisted and/or sympa­
thized with the September 30th Movement. According to 
authoritative information these are: S.B.P.U. - S.O.B.S.I.,
the People's Youth and other political parties and mass
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organizations with the same orientation and principles, i.e, 
the P.K.I. and its mass organizations, as follows: C.G.M.I.,
B.T.I., S.O.B.S.I,, Gerwani, Lekra, H.S.I., etc., as well 
as institutes of higher education and other educational 
institutes which have become hideouts for September 30th 
counter-revolutionaries.
B. Ban and revoke the publishing licenses of news­
papers and magazines which directly or indirectly assisted, 
spread and broadcast the activities of the "Counter-revolu­
tionary September 30th Movement," including Harian Rakjat,
Warta Bhakti, Bintang Timur, Kebudajaan Baru, Ekonomi Nasional, 
6eiora Indonesia, etc.
C. Confiscate all assets/wealth/property of these 
counter-revolutionary organizations and elements, and make 
them state property.
VI. We urge H.E, the President/Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Services/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno to 
purge the Dwikora Cabinet, State Institutes, the National 
Front, the National News Institute Antara, the Youth Front, 
the P.P.M.I., the P.W.I., the M.M.I., etc., of elements 
involved in, supporting, assisting and/or sympathizing with the 
"Counter-revolutionary September 30th Movement", as well as
of elements supporting,or in sympathy with these counter­
revolutionaries , and to punish them in accordance with 
existing revolutionary law.
VII. We are ready, in accordance with the TAKARI Message, 
to work with the Government and the Armed Forces in taking 
action against bureaucratic capitalists, corruptors, specu­
lators and other sowers of economic confusion.
VIII. We demand action be taken in accordance with the 
law of the Revolution against slanders on State authorities 
(the Army).
Finally we express our deep gratitude to Allah, Almighty 
and All-Merciful, that H.E. the President/Supreme Commander 
of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno 
and His Honor the Coordinating Minister for Defence and Secur­
ity /Armed Forces Chief of Staff General A.H. Nasution continue 
to be safe and well and are under His protection.
We call upon all political parties and mass organizations 
which are truly Pantjasilaist and Manipolist to assist the 
Armed Forces in destroying the "Counter-revolutionary Septem­
ber 30th Movement" down to its roots, and we are ready together 
with the Armed Forces under the leadership of H.E, the Presi­
dent/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the 
Revolution Bung Karno to defend and safeguard the Pantjasila 
State of the Proclamation of August 17, 1945, to the last 
drop of our blood.
Djakarta, October 4, 1965.
Action Unit for the Crushing of the "Counter-revolutionary 
September 30th Movement".
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* At this point the peking resumes its •normal* paraphrase.
On page 25, line 21: intentional 'errors' should read 'inten­
tional errors.'
On page 28, lines 35-36 should read:
K K K K N
[21.] . 3 3 .  6 5 3 2  6 6 5 6  5 ** 2 (3)
On page 29, line 47 should read: During the kraton rehearsal
hours on Wednesday nights, he generally plays. . . .
On page 29 at the bottom of the page there should be added 
the following:
(e) The greatest discrepancy between the manuscript and 
the recorded version lies in the time-duration. 
Whereas the manuscript specifies an optimum duration 
of 20'00", the recorded performance, even with in­
complete repetition, lasts 27'00".
[The author wishes to express his sincerest thanks to 
Mr. N. Tirtaamidjaja (Djakarta), who graciously pro­
vided all the factual information used in this note, 
and to Mr.B. Anderson (Ithaca), who removed the many 
Dutch idiosyncracies in the original English copy.]
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